Safran DIGITAL

Target: Safran S.A. Research date: 26 October 2026 Evidence period: 2010–2026 Scope: Enterprise technology, Israeli-origin vendors, surveillance, cloud infrastructure, defence-sector digital relationships, artificial intelligence, technology R&D and regulatory scrutiny.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

1.1 - Verified enterprise technology vendors

Safran Electronics & Defense selected Dassault Systèmes’ 3DEXPERIENCE product lifecycle management platform to support digital transformation and configuration management across its product lifecycle. Dassault Systèmes identifies Renaud Blech, Safran Electronics & Defense’s senior vice-president for digital transformation, as a source describing the platform’s role in its engineering processes. The customer reference was published before 2020 [pre-2020]; its continuing contractual status in October 2026 is not established by the source.¹

Safran Transmission Systems also adopted Dassault Systèmes’ 3DEXPERIENCE platform to rationalise previously separate information systems. Dassault Systèmes quoted the company’s CIO, Charles Manin, describing a unified view of business activities. This is historical evidence [pre-2020], with current deployment status unknown.²

Dassault Systèmes and Safran announced a strategic partnership concerning an integrated digital process for additive manufacturing, combining the 3DEXPERIENCE platform with Safran’s manufacturing expertise. The disclosed scope included material design, generative design, production optimisation and certification-related digital continuity. The original agreement predates 2020 [pre-2020]; the source does not establish a current Israeli technology component.³

1.2 - Israeli-origin enterprise software

No public evidence identified establishing Safran S.A. or its identified subsidiaries as customers of Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or another specifically identified Israeli-origin enterprise cybersecurity vendor.

The Dassault Systèmes customer references establish the use of a French-origin engineering platform; they do not identify an Israeli cloud host, security supplier or downstream Israeli software integration.^{1, 2}

1.3 - Technology integrators and procurement

Safran’s corporate digital-transformation materials identify enterprise digitalisation, industrial innovation and supplier-facing technology programmes, including the digiBuy supplier portal. These materials document the company’s digitalisation activities but do not provide a complete register of technology integrators, subcontractors or software licensing relationships.⁴

No public evidence identified that a named Safran enterprise technology integrator mandated or deployed Israeli-origin cybersecurity software in a Safran environment.

1.4 - Named-entity and act record

• Safran Electronics & Defense / Dassault Systèmes: Acting customer Safran Electronics & Defense; supplier Dassault Systèmes; beneficiary Safran engineering operations; channel 3ds.com; earliest verified observation before 2020 [pre-2020]; latest contract date unavailable; ongoing status unknown; product scope: 3DEXPERIENCE engineering PLM.¹
• Safran Transmission Systems / Dassault Systèmes: Acting customer Safran Transmission Systems; supplier Dassault Systèmes; beneficiary internal engineering and enterprise information management; channel 3ds.com; historical observation before 2020 [pre-2020]; latest deployment date unavailable; ongoing status unknown.²
• Safran / Dassault Systèmes: Acting entities Safran and Dassault Systèmes; beneficiaries their respective engineering and manufacturing programmes; channel 3ds.com; historical strategic announcement [pre-2020]; latest contract status unknown; no specific Israeli technology provision identified.³

These published corporate customer communications addressed Dassault Systèmes’ commercial and industrial audience; the accessible pages do not establish a fixed contractual term or the complete period during which each communication remained publicly displayed.^{1, 2, 3}

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

2.1 - Historical Israeli government security technology

On 14 April 2010 [pre-2020], Defense Daily reported that the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office had approved Morpho Detection’s Itemiser DX explosive-trace detection equipment for government use at border crossings, transportation facilities and other civilian or institutional locations. Morpho Detection was then part of Safran. The announcement established product approval but did not disclose an equipment purchase quantity, value or operational installation record.⁵

The acting supplier in that historical record was Morpho Detection; the approving institution was the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. The communication appeared on defensedaily.com in April 2010 and addressed the defence and homeland-security industry. The duration of the approval and exact deployment history are not established by the accessible report.⁵

On 7 April 2017 [pre-2020], Safran confirmed completion of the sale of Morpho Detection LLC and other detection activities to Smiths Group plc. Safran classified these operations as discontinued before completing the sale. This constitutes verified cessation of Safran’s ownership of the divested detection activities, although it does not independently establish the termination of every historical customer contract.⁶

Safran had separately announced negotiations to dispose of its identity and security activities to Advent International, in association with Bpifrance, in September 2016 [pre-2020]. The transaction contemplated combining these activities with Oberthur Technologies. The original announcement represented a proposed transaction rather than proof of completion.⁷

Safran’s subsequent financial communications documented the expected completion of its separate security and identity divestment in 2017. Accordingly, historical Morpho or identity-security operations require legal-entity and ownership-date verification before being attributed to Safran after 2017.⁸

2.2 - Facial recognition and biometric identification

Safran’s historical identity-security activities included identification and biometric technologies, while the European Commission’s 2017 review of Safran’s acquisition of Zodiac Aerospace documents Safran’s continuing aerospace and defence business scope. Neither record establishes that Safran’s post-divestment businesses operate an Israeli facial-recognition or Palestinian biometric-identification platform.^{7, 9}

No public evidence identified of Safran’s current use of Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax or another named Israeli-origin retail or facial-recognition platform.

2.3 - Predictive surveillance and indirect deployment

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin predictive-policing, employee-monitoring, behavioural-surveillance or social-media-monitoring systems deployed by Safran.

No public evidence identified that Safran receives these technologies indirectly through a verified managed-service provider or bundled enterprise platform.

2.4 - Data exposure

The historical Israeli approval of Morpho Detection equipment does not establish that biometric records or other personally identifiable information were stored, processed or made accessible in Israel. The identified Itemiser DX product concerned explosive-trace detection.⁵

No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli-hosted Safran biometric database or an ongoing Israeli data-processing arrangement involving Safran’s current group entities.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

3.1 - Israel-based infrastructure

Safran publishes a directory of international corporate, industrial, engineering and representative-office locations. The directory does not itself provide a complete map of enterprise cloud infrastructure, hosting subcontractors or cross-border data transfers.¹⁰

No public evidence identified establishing that Safran owns, leases or operates a data centre or sovereign-cloud region within Israel.

No public evidence identified of a Safran-operated data centre in an Israeli settlement or another occupied-territory location.

3.2 - Government cloud contracts

No public evidence identified establishing Safran as a Project Nimbus prime contractor, subcontractor, cloud-platform supplier or infrastructure operator.

No public evidence identified of Safran supplying general-purpose cloud compute, cloud storage or sovereign-cloud services under a specifically identified Israeli government programme.

3.3 - Data sovereignty and resilience

Safran’s digital-transformation programme concerns internal industrial efficiency, production systems and enterprise technology. Its public programme overview does not identify an Israeli government data-residency service or a dedicated Israeli sovereign-cloud product.⁴

No public evidence identified of an agreement through which Safran guarantees cloud infrastructure resilience, data residency or sovereign information processing for the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF or Israeli intelligence agencies.

3.4 - Enterprise and military data processing

The publicly identified Dassault Systèmes PLM deployments establish that Safran businesses process engineering and product-configuration information using 3DEXPERIENCE. The source material does not identify the geographical hosting locations or contractual access provisions for those deployments.^{1, 2}

No public evidence identified of Safran routing Palestinian identity, biometric, location or communications data through Israeli-controlled cloud infrastructure.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

4.1 - Rafael Advanced Defense Systems partnership

On 9 September 2021, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. and Safran Vectronix AG announced a memorandum of understanding covering the integration of Rafael’s FIRE WEAVER system with Safran’s MOSKITO TI observation and target-location device. The announcement was jointly attributed to the two companies and published through Safran’s corporate website.¹¹

The announced integration connected an observation and location sensor to a networked battlefield information and command system. Safran described FIRE WEAVER as linking sensors and effectors while presenting shared tactical information to commanders and soldiers. Its weapons-specific target selection and sensor-to-effector functionality belongs to Military; the documented technology integration and commercial relationship are recorded here.¹¹

National Defense Magazine reported on 14 June 2022 that Rafael and Safran Vectronix signed an agreement at Eurosatory to market the integrated FIRE WEAVER/MOSKITO TI system. The publication also reported Safran’s intention to integrate the system with additional target-location products. This documents a subsequent commercial activity following the 2021 memorandum of understanding.¹²

Act record - Rafael partnership

• Acting entities: Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. and Safran Vectronix AG.
• Recipient/beneficiary: Prospective military customers and users of integrated sensor and command systems.
• Technology: Rafael FIRE WEAVER and Safran MOSKITO TI.
• Channel: safran-group.com, followed by independent reporting on nationaldefensemagazine.org.
• Earliest verified observation: 9 September 2021.
• Latest independently verified commercial milestone: 14 June 2022.
• Initial act: Memorandum of understanding.
• Subsequent act: Commercial marketing agreement.
• Financial value: Not publicly established in the retrieved announcements.
• Deployment quantity: Not publicly established.
• October 2026 status: Unknown; no verified termination or contract renewal identified.
• Public communication: The 2021 corporate announcement addressed industry and potential defence customers. The 2022 reporting addressed the military procurement and technology sector. Exact audience size and the complete period of public display are not established.^{11, 12}

The public evidence establishes the relationship between Safran Vectronix and Rafael. It does not establish that the combined product was purchased or deployed by a particular Israeli military formation.^{11, 12}

4.2 - European Defence Fund ACTUS collaboration

Investigate Europe reported on 10 June 2025 that Safran participated in the ACTUS European Defence Fund programme alongside Intracom Defense and other European organisations. The programme concerns unmanned aircraft technology and weapons integration, including Safran’s Patroller aircraft.¹³

The investigation reported that ACTUS had a programme value of approximately €59 million, including €42 million in European Commission support. It identified Intracom Defense as programme coordinator and reported that Safran and Intracom together received more than half of the Commission’s €42 million contribution.¹³

Investigate Europe identified Israel Aerospace Industries as the owner of Intracom Defense, reporting that financial records showed an approximately 94.5% equity holding and 100% voting control. EUobserver independently published the programme’s Israeli-ownership connection in June 2025.^{13, 14}

The Irish Times reported in August 2025 that the Greek Ministry of Defence described a special security agreement restricting transfers of classified information and sensitive technology between Intracom Defense and Israel Aerospace Industries. This reported safeguard is relevant to assessing whether the consortium relationship resulted in onward technology transfers.¹⁵

Act record - ACTUS

• Acting group entity: Safran, identified as a consortium participant; the exact contracting subsidiary requires confirmation.
• Named consortium partner: Intracom Defense.
• Ultimate parent of partner: Israel Aerospace Industries.
• Recipient/beneficiary: ACTUS consortium members and participating European defence programmes.
• Channel: investigate-europe.eu, euobserver.com and irishtimes.com.
• Earliest documented programme activity: December 2024.
• Latest corroborating observation: August 2025.
• Programme duration: Reported as four years.
• Funding: Approximately €42 million in Commission funding within an approximately €59 million programme.
• Status at research date: The reported programme term extends beyond October 2026; no verified cancellation was identified.
• Safran-specific award value: The examined reporting does not establish a separate precise allocation.
• Israeli access to sensitive information: Not established; the reported security agreement describes restrictions on transfers.
• Technical scope: Drone-system development and integration; weapons-specific functions are referred to Military.^{13, 14, 15}

4.3 - Direct Israeli military and intelligence contracts

The documented Rafael collaboration involves an Israeli state-owned defence manufacturer. The source establishes a relationship with Rafael but does not independently establish a direct procurement contract between Safran Vectronix AG and the IDF or Israeli Ministry of Defence.¹¹

No public evidence identified of a separately verified direct Safran contract supplying administrative IT, cloud hosting or enterprise software to the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet or Israeli Ministry of Defence.

4.4 - Dual-use technologies and military deployment

The European Commission’s 2017 Safran/Zodiac Aerospace merger decision describes Safran Electronics & Defense’s optronics capabilities, including thermal imaging, observation devices and missile-guidance components. These disclosures establish Safran’s technological product scope but do not identify Israeli end users.⁹

No public evidence identified establishing the specific deployment of Safran’s general-purpose digital infrastructure for surveillance of Palestinians in occupied territories.

4.5 - Offensive cyber and weapons-specific systems

No public evidence identified of Safran selling zero-day exploits, offensive intrusion software or spyware to Israeli government agencies.

The FIRE WEAVER targeting integration and ACTUS weapon-integration programme are documented as technology relationships, but their purpose-built kinetic targeting and weapons effects are outside the substantive Digital assessment boundary.^{11, 13}

4.1 - Rafael Advanced Defense Systems partnership: integration completion. On 28 January 2022, Janes reported, following its coverage of the International Armoured Vehicles 2022 conference in London, that integration of Rafael’s FIRE WEAVER system with Safran’s MOSKITO TI target locator had been completed and the integrated system demonstrated to an undisclosed country. This establishes a reported technical milestone beyond the September 2021 memorandum of understanding. It corrects any characterisation of integration completion as unconfirmed, while confirming the existing audit’s description of the September 2021 agreement as the initial formal collaboration. The reporting does not identify the demonstration customer, establish procurement of the combined system or independently verify operational deployment.¹⁶

4.1 - Rafael Advanced Defense Systems partnership: subsequent commercial agreement. On 14 June 2022, National Defense Magazine reported directly from Eurosatory in Paris that Safran Vectronix and Rafael signed a further agreement formally launching their joint marketing collaboration for the FIRE WEAVER/MOSKITO TI integration. Safran Vice President of Sales and Marketing Patrick Drach discussed the arrangement at the exhibition, including Rafael’s opportunity to reach Safran’s existing customers. He also described plans to extend FIRE WEAVER integration to additional target-location equipment. This confirms the existing audit’s 14 June 2022 commercial milestone and corrects any assertion that September 2021 was the latest documented agreement event. The June announcement establishes a signed marketing agreement and prospective integration expansion; it does not independently establish completion of those additional integrations, their commercial value or subsequent deliveries.¹²

4.1 - Rafael Advanced Defense Systems partnership: deployment attribution. National Defense Magazine distinguished existing Israeli Defense Forces use of FIRE WEAVER from the Safran MOSKITO TI collaboration. Its 14 June 2022 reporting identified FIRE WEAVER as already used by the IDF independently of the joint integration agreement. Consequently, reported deployment of the underlying Rafael system cannot be treated as evidence that the combined Safran/Rafael configuration was purchased or fielded by the IDF. This confirms the existing audit’s qualification that a particular Israeli military deployment of the combined product remains unverified, while the January 2022 Janes report establishes that a completed integration had been demonstrated to an unidentified country.^{16, 12}

4.1 - Rafael partnership: functionality of the completed MOSKITO TI/FIRE WEAVER integration. The January 2022 Janes report establishes that integration of Rafael’s FIRE WEAVER with Safran Vectronix’s MOSKITO TI target locator had been completed and demonstrated to an unidentified country. The September 2021 partnership announcement, independently reproduced by Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, identifies the integration’s digital functions as connecting MOSKITO TI’s observation, measurement and geolocation capabilities with FIRE WEAVER’s networked battlefield information system. The pairing enables tactical personnel to share an integrated battlefield picture and exchange operational information, including target-location data. National Defense’s June 2022 reporting additionally describes target identification, transmission of fire requests to commanders and receipt of engagement decisions through augmented-reality overlays on compatible aiming devices, explicitly naming MOSKITO TI as an example. Taken together, these sources support a completed sensor-to-network integration and a documented intended user-facing targeting workflow. Janes does not provide a technical breakdown of the completed demonstration sufficient to independently verify that every advertised display or targeting function was exercised.^{16, 17, 12}

4.1 - Rafael partnership: automated shooter selection and Safran’s integration boundary. National Defense reported on 14 June 2022 that FIRE WEAVER uses artificial intelligence to process real-time battlefield information and automatically select the most appropriate shooter for a target. The article describes this functionality while discussing the Safran/Rafael partnership and identifies MOSKITO TI as a compatible targeting device. The September 2021 partnership announcement likewise expressly includes instantaneous effector selection among FIRE WEAVER’s capabilities. Independent technical reporting published in May 2021 explains that Rafael’s AI software calculates target-to-weapon pairings using predetermined commander-defined rules, with relevant targeting information subsequently transferred to the selected shooter’s sight. Consequently, automated shooter selection was an established capability of the Rafael system into which MOSKITO TI was integrated. The completed integration connected Safran’s target-location equipment to a system providing that functionality; attribution does not require Safran to have developed Rafael’s AI algorithms. However, the examined sources do not establish whether the specific MOSKITO TI integration demonstration exercised an automated shooter-selection sequence or merely verified interoperability with the system supporting that capability.^{16, 17, 12, 18}

4.1 - Rafael partnership: distinction between implemented functionality and expansion plans. The demonstrated MOSKITO TI integration represents a completed technical integration of one identified Safran device into Rafael’s sensor-to-effector architecture. FIRE WEAVER’s wider capabilities, including automated effector selection, common operational pictures, augmented-reality presentation and electronic target handoff, are documented independently of that demonstration. The September 2021 partnership announcement presents these as capabilities of the combined solution and underlying network, while National Defense’s June 2022 reporting describes how the targeting workflow can operate through a device such as MOSKITO TI. Neither publication provides a demonstration-specific verification matrix identifying which features were individually tested. Furthermore, Safran Vice President Patrick Drach’s June 2022 statements concerning extension of FIRE WEAVER to additional target locators describe future integration intentions. They cannot be treated as evidence that those additional integrations were completed by June 2022.^{16, 17, 12, 18}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

5.1 - Acquisition of Preligens

On 24 June 2024, Safran announced exclusive discussions to acquire Preligens, a French AI company specialising in analysis of high-resolution imagery, video and acoustic signals for aerospace and defence applications. Safran identified the proposed enterprise value as €220 million.¹⁹

Safran confirmed completion of the acquisition on 2 September 2024 at the same enterprise value. Preligens became Safran.AI within Safran Electronics & Defense. Safran described AI-assisted identification of objects of military interest using commercial and government satellite imagery, among other sources.²⁰

Act record - Preligens acquisition

• Acting entity: Safran S.A.
• Acquired entity: Preligens.
• Subsequent operating identity: Safran.AI.
• Group beneficiary: Safran Electronics & Defense.
• Channel: safran-group.com, independently reproduced on marketscreener.com.
• Initial dated observation: 24 June 2024.
• Completed transaction: 2 September 2024.
• Enterprise value: €220 million.
• Current corporate status: Safran continues to present Safran.AI as a group company.
• Israeli customer or Israeli technology-transfer connection: Not established.
• Public communication: Corporate transaction announcements addressed investors, industry participants and customers; the size of the audience and precise continuing publication history are not stated.^{19, 20, 21}

5.2 - Current AI capabilities

Safran.AI’s corporate profile describes AI applications for aerospace and defence alongside industrial inspection. Its current public materials identify precision AI for non-destructive testing and automated quality inspection.²¹

The acquisition announcement separately identifies AI processing of satellite imagery, full-motion video and acoustic signals for defence and intelligence applications. These are independently relevant computer-vision and data-analysis capabilities; the source does not identify an Israeli state customer.²⁰

Defence News reported in June 2024 that Preligens’ imagery-recognition technology had been used by French military intelligence and that the company also worked with other international defence and security customers. Its reporting did not identify a specific Israeli government contract.²²

5.3 - AI provision to Israeli state institutions

No public evidence identified establishing Safran.AI or Preligens as a supplier of artificial intelligence to the IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies or Israeli police.

No public evidence identified of a named Safran AI model used for intelligence analysis of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank or East Jerusalem.

5.4 - Training data and data residency

Safran’s acquisition announcement establishes that Preligens trained algorithms using substantial quantities of data from multiple imagery and sensor sources. It does not identify a Palestinian civilian surveillance dataset or Israeli state-supplied training corpus.²⁰

No public evidence identified establishing that Safran.AI trained models on intercepted Palestinian communications, Israeli military surveillance databases or Palestinian biometric records.

No public evidence identified establishing that Safran.AI training data was stored in Israel or made available to Israeli authorities.

5.5 - Autonomous systems

The Rafael FIRE WEAVER partnership involves software connecting battlefield sensors with effectors and supporting military targeting workflows. The publicly disclosed system’s principal weapons-specific functionality is allocated to Military.¹¹

No public evidence identified establishing that Safran supplied autonomous target-generation or autonomous lethal-decision software directly to an Israeli military or security organisation.

5.5 - FIRE WEAVER artificial intelligence: attribution to the completed Safran integration. The AI-based shooter-selection function described by National Defense in June 2022 was part of Rafael’s existing FIRE WEAVER technology, rather than functionality first introduced through the Safran partnership. Defense News documented the system’s computer-vision and AI-assisted allocation capabilities in February 2020, before the September 2021 Safran agreement. Its reporting described algorithms that evaluate battlefield sensor information to identify suitable weapons and units, with commanders and selected operators retaining approval responsibilities. May 2021 technical reporting independently explained that the system generates target-and-weapon pairings according to commander-defined rules. The completed MOSKITO TI integration therefore connected Safran’s observation and geolocation equipment to a networked system possessing documented AI-assisted targeting functionality. This supports technical integration with an AI-enabled targeting architecture without establishing that Safran authored, supplied or operated the underlying AI decision engine.^{12, 18, 23}

5.5 - Demonstration-level verification of automated selection. January 2022–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the examined Janes integration-completion report, September 2021 partnership announcement, June 2022 National Defense account and independent descriptions of FIRE WEAVER’s AI capabilities do not disclose a MOSKITO TI-specific demonstration log, software architecture, acceptance-test results or witnessed sequence showing that the completed configuration actually performed automatic shooter selection during its demonstration. The evidence supports completed hardware/software interoperability with Rafael’s AI-enabled system and documents the system’s automated targeting capabilities, but leaves the precise functionality exercised during the Safran-specific demonstration unverified. There is likewise no evidence in these sources that automated selection was excluded or disabled in the integrated configuration. The appropriate finding is confirmed integration with an AI-capable targeting system, with demonstration-specific execution of automated selection unresolved.^{16, 17, 12, 18, 23}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

6.1 - Group structure and ownership

Safran’s 2025 integrated report records 418,344,626 shares at 31 December 2025, with the French state holding 11.72%, employees holding 5.55%, treasury shares representing 0.34%, and the public holding 82.39%.²⁴

The French state is the only explicitly identified shareholder holding at least 10% in the disclosed ownership summary. The public-float percentage is an aggregate category and does not itself identify individual beneficial owners.²⁴

Safran’s governance disclosures identify Ross McInnes as Chairman and Olivier Andriès as Chief Executive Officer. The board includes directors representing employees, shareholders and the French state. The 2026 governance announcements additionally document Anne Bouverot’s appointment in place of Monique Cohen.²⁵

6.2 - Controlling principals and named-person screening

• French State: Holder of 11.72% of Safran’s equity at 31 December 2025. No public evidence identified of a Safran-attributable personal technology investment through this shareholder relationship.²⁴
• Ross McInnes: Safran Chairman. No public evidence identified establishing an attributable personal investment in an Israeli surveillance, cyber or military-AI company.²⁵
• Olivier Andriès: Safran CEO and director. No public evidence identified establishing an attributable personal investment in an Israeli surveillance, cyber or military-AI company.²⁵
• Valérie Baudson: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Fabrice Brégier: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Anne Bouverot: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Laurent Guillot: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Monique Cohen: Former director, replaced by Anne Bouverot at the 2026 Annual General Meeting; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Patrick Pélata: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Robert Peugeot: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Fabienne Lecorvaisier: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Daniela Schwarzer: Independent director; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Alexandre Lahousse: Director proposed by the French state; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Guillemette Kreis: French state representative; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁶
• Anne Aubert: Employee-shareholder representative; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Christèle Debarenne-Fievet: Employee representative; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Pascale Dosda: Employee-shareholder representative; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵
• Ivan Hardouin: Employee representative; no verified personal Israeli technology investment identified in the materials examined.²⁵

The governance disclosures establish named appointments and positions but do not provide an exhaustive account of directors’ private venture investments or family-office holdings. No confirmed positive Israeli technology-investment act involving an identified controlling principal was established by the retrieved evidence.²⁵

6.3 - Integrated group entities

Safran’s corporate disclosures and customer references identify Safran Electronics & Defense, Safran Vectronix AG, Safran Transmission Systems, Safran.AI, Safran Data Systems and Safran Reosc as relevant named entities within its industrial and technological activities.^{1, 2, 11, 21, 27}

Morpho Detection is a former Safran subsidiary whose ownership ended through the completed April 2017 divestment.⁶

Safran’s acquisition of Zodiac Aerospace was subject to a European Commission merger decision dated 21 December 2017. That historical corporate transaction establishes an additional integrated aerospace business but does not independently establish an Israeli digital-technology relationship.⁹

6.4 - Israeli R&D facilities

Safran’s publicly accessible locations directory identifies its international office, engineering and industrial footprint. It is a corporate location directory rather than a complete register of controlled subsidiaries, cloud processors and research subcontractors.¹⁰

No public evidence identified of a Safran-owned Israeli cybersecurity research centre, AI laboratory or dedicated Israeli software-development facility.

No public evidence identified of a Safran-operated R&D facility in an Israeli settlement.

6.5 - Israeli-origin acquisitions

Safran’s acquisition of Preligens was a transaction involving a French company, subsequently integrated into Safran Electronics & Defense. The acquired business was not identified as an Israeli-origin company in the transaction announcement.²⁰

No public evidence identified of Safran acquiring Check Point, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Wiz or another Israeli cybersecurity company.

No public evidence identified of a directly attributable Safran venture investment in an Israeli offensive-cyber or military-surveillance startup.

6.6 - Technology consortium relationships

The ACTUS programme provides a documented example of Safran’s participation in a multinational defence-technology consortium alongside Intracom Defense, which the 2025 investigation identifies as controlled by Israel Aerospace Industries.^{13, 14}

The investigated relationship concerns programme participation and funding. It does not, on the sources examined, independently establish transfer of Safran’s intellectual property to Israel Aerospace Industries.^{13, 15}

6.7 - Patents and intellectual property

No public evidence identified establishing a specific jointly assigned Safran patent, licensing agreement or bilateral AI research agreement with Technion, Hebrew University or the Weizmann Institute.

No public evidence identified establishing Israeli ownership of Safran.AI’s proprietary models or their training datasets.

6.2 - French State representative: verified appointment chronology and October 2026 correction. On 26 October 2026, Guillemette Kreis was the French State’s representative on Safran’s Board of Directors. The appointment was made by ministerial order dated 16 September 2026, published in the Journal officiel on 30 September 2026, expressly replacing Chloé Raison. The official appointment record is independently indexed by JORFSearch, which identifies Kreis as the incoming representative and Raison as her predecessor. This confirms the existing audit’s identification of Kreis as the French State representative and establishes the appointment date missing from section 6.2. It also resolves the chronological ambiguity arising from earlier governance disclosures: Raison’s appointment had been superseded before the audit’s 26 October 2026 research date.²⁶

6.2 - Chloé Raison: appointment and departure chronology. Safran’s publicly reproduced corporate legal announcement records that its Board, meeting on 16 June 2026, acknowledged Céline Fornaro’s resignation effective 1 June 2026 and Chloé Raison’s appointment as French State representative effective 12 June 2026. The appointment was subsequently superseded by the ministerial order of 16 September 2026 naming Guillemette Kreis in Raison’s place. Thus, the public records establish Raison’s appointment date as 12 June 2026 and her replacement through the order dated 16 September 2026, published on 30 September 2026. The replacement order establishes the succession but does not separately specify a resignation date for Raison. This confirms the existing audit’s identification of Kreis and clarifies that Raison held the position during the intervening period in 2026.^{26, 28}

6.6 - PROACTIF consortium: verified Safran and Mellanox participation. The European Commission’s CORDIS record confirms that PROACTIF (grant agreement 101194239), formally titled “Unmanned Vehicles for Civil Security and Surveillance Missions”, is a Horizon Europe Chips Joint Undertaking project coordinated by Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy. The grant agreement was signed on 16 May 2025, with a project period from 1 May 2025 to 30 April 2028. CORDIS identifies SAFRAN ELECTRONICS & DEFENSE SPAIN SOCIEDAD LIMITADA, based in Granada, Spain, as a funded participant, recording €734,989.50 in total participation costs and €146,997.86 in net EU financial contribution. The same official participant register identifies MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES LTD - MLNX, based in Yokneam, Israel, as another funded participant, recording €1,198,127.00 in total participation costs and €239,625.40 in net EU financial contribution. Both organisations therefore participate in the same verified multinational technology consortium. Fraunhofer IZM independently corroborates their inclusion in its published PROACTIF partner list, naming Safran Electronics & Defense/SED Spain S.L. and Mellanox Technologies Ltd. The documented relationship is consortium co-participation; these records do not independently establish a bilateral contract between Safran and Mellanox.^{29, 30}

6.6 - PROACTIF technical scope and Safran’s documented role. PROACTIF develops technologies for unmanned aerial, ground and maritime vehicles supporting civil security, critical-infrastructure surveillance and emergency management. Its research covers sensors, radar, LiDAR, infrared and hyperspectral sensing, AI-supported perception, edge-cloud data processing, cybersecurity, communications, positioning, mission management and coordinated unmanned-vehicle operations. The programme includes demonstrations involving ports, rail yards, energy infrastructure, emergency response, search and rescue and crowd monitoring. CORDIS records a total project cost of €41,821,140.26 and an EU contribution of €11,547,260.03. Safran Electronics & Defense Spain’s documented role is participation as a named funded consortium organisation. The examined CORDIS record, Chips Joint Undertaking project description and Fraunhofer partner register do not assign Safran a specific technical work package, deliverable or leadership responsibility, nor establish that Safran exchanged proprietary technology, operational data or intellectual property directly with Mellanox. The precise Safran–Mellanox technical collaboration and any resulting technology transfers remain unverified.^{29, 30, 31}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

7.1 - Investigations into Israeli defence-industry connections

Investigate Europe’s June 2025 investigation identified Safran as a participant in the European Defence Fund’s ACTUS project alongside Intracom Defense. It investigated the implications of the latter company’s ownership by Israel Aerospace Industries.¹³

EUobserver’s June 2025 reporting independently described the same consortium and identified Israeli state-owned defence-industry participation through Intracom Defense. Its account placed Safran among the named European industrial participants.¹⁴

The Irish Times revisited the issue in August 2025, reporting both the Israeli ownership relationship and the Greek government’s account of safeguards intended to restrict sensitive technology transfers between Intracom Defense and Israel Aerospace Industries.¹⁵

7.2 - UN and NGO records

The American Friends Service Committee maintains a public list of companies identified in its investigation of military equipment supplied to Israel during the conflict beginning in October 2023. This page establishes the scope of that NGO investigation, but the retrieved material does not establish a specific Safran technology-contract finding within the list.³²

No public evidence identified establishing Safran’s inclusion in the OHCHR settlement business database.

No public evidence identified establishing that UN A/HRC/59/23 expressly attributes Project Nimbus, Israeli surveillance-cloud infrastructure or military AI data provision to Safran.

No independently verified finding from Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or Don’t Buy Into Occupation established a Safran-specific digital service deployed in an Israeli settlement.

7.3 - Boycott, divestment and public campaigning

The ACTUS reporting documents public scrutiny of European defence funding involving Israeli state-owned defence industry. The investigated issue concerns consortium ownership and programme funding rather than a verified Safran software deployment in occupied territory.^{13, 14}

No public evidence identified of a named organised boycott campaign specifically directed at Safran’s enterprise cloud, cybersecurity or biometric technology provision to Israeli state institutions.

No public evidence identified of a Safran corporate statement responding specifically to a Digital-focused boycott campaign.

7.4 - Legal and regulatory actions

The European Commission issued its Safran/Zodiac Aerospace merger decision on 21 December 2017, documenting Safran’s optronics and related defence capabilities. The decision is a competition review and does not constitute a finding concerning technology provision to Israeli state entities.⁹

No public evidence identified of a regulator imposing penalties on Safran for exporting surveillance software, cloud services or biometric databases to Israel.

No public evidence identified of a concluded court ruling establishing that Safran supplied prohibited digital surveillance technology for use in occupied Palestinian territory.

7.5 - Post-July and post-November 2024 activity

Safran’s Rafael agreement was announced in September 2021, followed by reported commercial marketing activity in June 2022. Neither dated source establishes a new transaction after 19 July 2024 or the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.^{11, 12}

ACTUS was publicly documented in 2025 as a programme involving Safran and Intracom Defense, whose Israeli parent company was identified in the same investigation. This provides evidence of consortium participation after both temporal reference dates, but the sources do not establish a prohibited transfer of classified information or the use of the resulting technology by Israeli forces.^{13, 15}

7.6 - Settlement-specific technology

No public evidence identified of Safran providing a named digital platform, cloud service, facial-recognition system or surveillance database directly to an Israeli settlement municipality, settlement-based company or settlement security body.

No public evidence identified of an authorised Safran software distributor, reseller or licensee deploying a verified Safran digital product within occupied Palestinian territory.