Safran MILITARY

Target: Safran SA Domain: Military Research date: 26 October 2026 Scope: Defence procurement, military targeting systems, weapons-related technology, Israeli defence-industry cooperation, military supply chains, occupied-territory activities, export controls and documented civil-society scrutiny.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Israeli government procurement - Arrow 3 telemetry

In 2022, Safran reported an Israeli government order for new-generation Range Telemetry Receivers (RTRs), Radio Signal Recorders (RSRs) and Ground Modular Data Recorders (GMDRs), intended for a test centre supporting development of the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system; the order is also described in the Association France Palestine Solidarité’s April 2024 account of Safran’s Israel-related defence activities.¹

The Israeli Ministry of Defense identifies Israel Aerospace Industries as the primary Arrow 3 contractor, Elbit Systems as responsible for its battle-management system, and Rafael and Tomer as major interceptor subcontractors.²

The Israeli Ministry of Defense reported Arrow 3’s first operational interception on 9 November 2023, establishing operational use of the wider weapons programme after Safran’s reported equipment order.²

Act record - Israeli government telemetry procurement

• Acting entity: Safran, with the precise contracting subsidiary unresolved.
• Recipient: Israeli government; the individual purchasing department was not established.
• Beneficiary: Israeli Arrow 3 missile-defence development programme.
• Channel: Government procurement described in Safran’s annual reporting and reproduced by civil-society reporting.
• Public reporting domain: france-palestine.org, referring to Safran’s corporate disclosure.
• Earliest identified order: 2022.
• Latest Safran-specific confirmation: 2022 order, discussed again in April 2024.
• Current status: Unknown.
• Contract value: Not established.
• End-user licence: Not established.¹

Rafael targeting-system agreement

On 9 September 2021, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. and Safran Vectronix AG announced a memorandum of understanding covering integration of Safran’s MOSKITO TI observation and target-location equipment with Rafael’s FIRE WEAVER sensor-to-effector system.³

Safran described FIRE WEAVER as connecting battlefield sensors and effectors, sharing targeting information and facilitating precision engagements.³

Independent reporting by Janes in 2022 stated that the FIRE WEAVER/MOSKITO TI integration had been completed and demonstrated to an undisclosed country.⁴

The available publications establish a bilateral military-technology relationship and subsequent reported integration, but do not identify an Israeli government purchase contract for the complete Safran-integrated configuration.^{3, 4}

Act record - Safran/Rafael integration

• Acting entities: Safran Vectronix AG and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.
• Beneficiaries: Military customers for integrated tactical targeting equipment.
• Channel: Bilateral memorandum and technical integration.
• Publication domains: safran-group.com and janes.com.
• Earliest dated observation: 9 September 2021.
• Latest dated integration observation: 2022.
• Status at research date: Unknown.
• Confirmed termination: no public evidence identified.
• Contract value and Israeli end-user purchase: no public evidence identified.^{3, 4}

Defence trade directories and Israeli contracting registers

No public evidence identified of a Safran-specific SIBAT tender award or defence export-directory listing establishing an additional Israeli procurement contract.

The underlying corporate disclosure concerning the 2022 Israeli telemetry order has been identified in Safran’s 2022 Universal Registration Document, published on 3 April 2023 and covering operations during 2022. The relevant passage appears under “Telemetry solutions” in the review of operations. It identifies Safran as the supplier and the Israeli government as the purchaser, describing a major order for new-generation flight-test Range Telemetry Receivers (RTRs), Radio Signal Recorders (RSRs) and Ground Modular Data Recorders (GMDRs). It states that the equipment was intended for installation at a test centre to finalise development of the Arrow 3 anti-missile system. However, the located corporate document is hosted on a prohibited citation domain, and an independently accessible permitted-host copy could not be verified. The directly accessible AFPS publication corroborates the existence of Safran’s reported announcement and identifies the Israeli government, the order and the principal equipment categories. It does not independently establish delivery, installation, acceptance or operational use.⁵

The 2022 disclosure’s language establishes an order and intended future installation, rather than a completed delivery. No individual Safran contracting subsidiary, purchasing department, contract signature date, contract value, delivery date, test-centre location, equipment serial number or acceptance certificate was identified in the accessible AFPS account. Its description of electronic components integrated into Arrow 3 is broader than the underlying procurement particulars independently verified through that account. The identified equipment was intended to support development testing; the evidence does not establish that Safran manufactured interceptor components or that its telemetry equipment was incorporated into operational Arrow 3 interceptors. The order’s fulfilment and subsequent contractual status remain unresolved.⁵

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Military-purpose target-location equipment

Safran Vectronix AG markets MOSKITO observation and location equipment with range measurement, azimuth determination, night-vision capability, GPS connectivity and compatibility with military navigation devices.⁶

Safran identifies Safran Vectronix AG as a manufacturer of tactical observation equipment and reports certification against NATO quality-assurance requirements.⁷

The 2021 MOSKITO TI/FIRE WEAVER announcement describes a purpose-built military targeting configuration that supports detecting, locating and engaging targets.³

These capabilities establish a military-product category and a documented defence integration, without independently establishing the identity of every purchaser or end-user.^{3, 6}

Civilian-to-military distinction

The standard MOSKITO product has observation and geolocation capabilities suitable for different applications, while the MOSKITO TI/FIRE WEAVER configuration is specifically described as an integrated battlefield sensor-to-effector solution.^{3, 6}

Janes reported completed integration in 2022, establishing technical cooperation beyond the original announcement, although its report did not identify an Israeli purchaser of the completed configuration.⁴

Broader military equipment portfolio

Safran describes its defence portfolio as including military aircraft engines, navigation systems, optronics, aircraft equipment and other mission-critical systems.⁸

Safran Electronics & Defense identifies military customers across land, maritime, aerospace and space applications.⁹

End-user certificates and export licences

No public evidence identified of a specific export-licence number or end-user certificate for MOSKITO TI or the FIRE WEAVER integration supplied to Israeli forces.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Occupied-territory equipment use

No public evidence identified of Safran-branded construction machinery or vehicles used in settlement construction, demolition, the separation barrier or military infrastructure in the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan Heights.

Direct versus indirect supply

No public evidence identified of Safran supplying heavy construction equipment through an Israeli distributor for settlement-related works.

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of Safran contracts to construct or maintain checkpoints, detention facilities, settlement infrastructure or military installations in occupied territories.

Settlement-database context

AFSC Investigate describes its research as covering companies connected to Israeli military occupation and settlement-related activities, drawing on sources including Who Profits and the United Nations settlement database.¹⁰

Who Profits maintains a corporate database addressing business involvement in Israel’s occupation economy and publishes research covering settlement infrastructure and military-industry relationships.¹¹

No verified Safran-specific settlement entry was established in the reviewed publicly accessible material.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.

Safran Vectronix AG entered a documented military-system integration relationship with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. in September 2021, involving MOSKITO TI and FIRE WEAVER.³

The integration connects Safran’s electro-optical target-location technology with Rafael’s networked battlefield targeting and engagement architecture.³

Janes reported completion of the integration in 2022 and stated that the resulting configuration had been demonstrated to an undisclosed country.⁴

Elbit Systems Ltd. - historical tactical UAV agreement [pre-2020]

On 15 September 2010, Elbit Systems Ltd. and Sagem Défense Sécurité SA, then part of Safran, announced a memorandum of agreement concerning an intended equally owned venture addressing tactical unmanned aircraft systems in France and selected international markets.¹²

The proposed venture was to be established in France, with activities envisaged at Eragny and Montluçon, and would combine existing and newly developed products from the two companies.¹²

Contemporary defence reporting independently described the proposed Sagem–Elbit venture and its tactical UAV purpose.¹³

The agreement concerned an intended venture; the consulted sources do not verify subsequent incorporation, completed production, Israeli military deliveries or continued operation.^{12, 13}

Act record - historical Sagem/Elbit agreement

• Acting entities: Sagem Défense Sécurité SA and Elbit Systems Ltd.
• Intended beneficiaries: French and selected international tactical UAV customers.
• Channel: Bilateral memorandum concerning a proposed joint venture.
• Publication domains: airframer.com and opex360.com.
• Earliest observation: 15 September 2010 [pre-2020].
• Latest verified operational event: No incorporated venture or delivery established.
• Status: Unknown.
• Israeli military procurement: no public evidence identified.^{12, 13}

Israel Aerospace Industries

The Israeli Ministry of Defense identifies Israel Aerospace Industries as the principal industrial contractor for Arrow 3, the missile-defence programme for which Safran reported supplying development-test telemetry equipment.²

The documented Safran relationship is with an Israeli government order supporting Arrow 3 development; a separate direct purchase contract between Israel Aerospace Industries and Safran was not established.^{1, 2}

Joint development and coproduction

The 2021 Rafael agreement and 2010 Sagem–Elbit announcement constitute documented military-industry cooperation involving Safran businesses, although their contractual structures and verified implementation differ.^{3, 12}

2026 cooperation with THEON

On 15 June 2026, Safran Electronics & Defense announced cooperation with THEON concerning electro-optical equipment for defence applications, including drone-related technologies.¹⁴

THEON’s corresponding announcement described planned development of optronic systems supporting intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting functions.¹⁵

These announcements establish a military-sector industrial relationship, but identify no Israeli government customer or Israeli defence-prime procurement agreement.^{14, 15}

Contemporaneous reporting from the International Armoured Vehicles 2022 conference in London confirms that the MOSKITO TI/FIRE WEAVER technical integration progressed beyond the September 2021 memorandum of understanding. Janes reported that integration had been completed and the combined system demonstrated to an undisclosed country. This independently corroborates the existing audit statements under “Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.” and “Rafael targeting-system agreement” describing completed integration in 2022. It corrects any competing characterization that implementation remained unconfirmed. The evidence establishes technical integration and a demonstration, but does not establish delivery to an identified military customer or operational deployment of the combined configuration.⁴

A further bilateral agreement was signed on 14 June 2022 at Eurosatory in Paris. National Defense, reporting directly from the exhibition, documented Safran Vectronix and Rafael’s announcement of an official sales and marketing collaboration concerning FIRE WEAVER and MOSKITO TI. Safran Vice President of Sales and Marketing Patrick Drach explained that the arrangement would allow Rafael to approach Safran’s existing customer base while expanding Safran’s product capabilities. The companies envisaged extending FIRE WEAVER integration to additional target locators used by infantry and special forces internationally. This establishes a distinct commercial agreement subsequent to the September 2021 technical-integration memorandum. It therefore corrects any chronology identifying September 2021 as the latest documented Safran–Rafael agreement event: the latest agreement established by the reviewed contemporaneous sources is 14 June 2022.¹⁶

The June 2022 reporting also establishes an important end-user distinction. Rafael executive Shmulik Olanski confirmed that FIRE WEAVER was already used by the Israel Defense Forces independently of the MOSKITO TI agreement. Consequently, Israeli military operation of FIRE WEAVER cannot independently establish Israeli deployment or procurement of the Safran-integrated configuration. The completed integration, demonstration to an undisclosed country and subsequent marketing agreement establish an implemented technical and commercial relationship, while leaving the identity of purchasers, contractual sales values and deployment of the combined configuration unresolved. This confirms the existing audit’s distinction between the Israeli acquisition of FIRE WEAVER and the unverified Israeli acquisition of its MOSKITO TI integration.^{4, 16}

Safran Electronics & Defense - reported physical shipments to Elbit Systems, 2023

An investigation published on 7 April 2026 by Christophe Ayad and Olivier Pinaud in Le Monde identifies Safran among French manufacturers supplying components to Israeli defence companies. The investigation examines a 66-page report, Les dessous des exportations militaires françaises vers Israël, prepared by Urgence Palestine and Palestinian Youth Movement. The organisations documented 525 military-related shipments from French manufacturers to Israeli weapons producers between October 2023 and 27 March 2026. Elbit Systems reportedly accounted for virtually all purchases. The report describes physical supply-chain transactions involving manufactured components rather than completed weapons. Le Monde independently obtained and examined the report, corroborating its publication and contents, although the article does not independently authenticate every underlying shipping record.^{17, 18}

The investigation’s indexed shipment schedule identifies three Safran Electronics & Defense recipient relationships in late 2023: Elbit Systems C4I and Cyber, Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Elop, and Elbit Systems Land. The reported entries respectively concern seven gyroscopic sensors, two items without a disclosed product description, and three items without a disclosed product description. The recorded departure and arrival dates are 1 October–26 November 2023 for C4I and Cyber, 1 October–23 November 2023 for Elop, and 2–26 November 2023 for Elbit Systems Land. Each entry names Domérat, France, as the origin, Paris as an intermediate transport point, Tel Aviv as the destination, and El Al Israel Airlines as the carrier. The schedule labels its figures as quantities, but the accessible reporting does not establish whether every figure represents individual components, packages or separately counted consignments. These particulars are attributed to the investigation’s indexed schedule; independently authenticated carrier manifests or customs declarations were not identified in the accessible news coverage.^{17, 18}

The original investigation was produced by Urgence Palestine and Palestinian Youth Movement using open-source research and shipping information. Le Monde reports that more than 90% of the documented consignments travelled with El Al and that the majority of flights departed from Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport. This is consistent with the routes reported for Safran Electronics & Defense. However, the accessible articles do not identify the commercial shipping-data provider, original customs-record custodian, individual airway-bill numbers, declaration identifiers or precise documentary acquisition method for the three Safran Electronics & Defense entries. Nor do they establish that Le Monde independently obtained the original carrier records. Accordingly, the shipment details constitute specific documentary allegations reproduced from the investigation, supported by independent reporting of the investigation’s findings, with transaction-level primary-source authentication outstanding.^{17, 18, 19}

Safran Aerosystems - additional reported physical shipments to Elbit Systems, 2023–2024

The April 2026 investigation’s indexed regional schedule additionally identifies Safran Aerosystems as an exporter to Elbit Systems EW & SIGINT–Elisra. It records an isolation-equipped non-return valve departing Roche-la-Molière on 24 November 2023 and arriving on 26 November 2023, quantity one; a manual actuator departing 1 December and arriving 3 December 2023, quantity one; an aircraft-parts entry spanning 6 December 2023 to 10 June 2024, quantity sixteen; an inline non-return valve dated 12–14 January 2024, quantity two; and electronic equipment dated 25–29 January 2024, quantity one. The reported route was Roche-la-Molière–Lyon–Paris–Tel Aviv, using El Al. These entries identify another Safran group business and another Elbit recipient absent from the existing audit. The extended aircraft-parts date range must not be interpreted as sixteen independently verified delivery dates. Individual shipment manifests, purchase orders and receipt confirmations were not identified in the accessible secondary coverage.^{17, 19}

A Belgian investigation published on 12 March 2025 identified an additional Safran group military supply-chain relationship involving Safran Aero Boosters, based in Herstal, Belgium, and the American engine manufacturer General Electric (GE). Safran Aero Boosters supplies components for GE’s F110 jet engines. These components are exported to the United States, incorporated into GE engines and subsequently installed in F-15 and F-16 combat aircraft, including aircraft operated by the Israeli Air Force. The supply route is therefore indirect: Safran Aero Boosters → General Electric (United States) → completed F110 engines → military aircraft → Israeli Air Force. The Belgian peace organisation Vredesactie documented this relationship in its March 2025 investigation, and the independent Belgian peace and security research institute GRIP subsequently examined and corroborated the reported industrial supply-chain relationship in an analysis published on 11 September 2025. This establishes a named American defence-industry intermediary and an identifiable military engine programme associated with Safran group manufacturing.^{20, 21}

The historical supply relationship must be distinguished from subsequent deliveries and maintenance. GRIP confirms that the relevant Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft were originally delivered by the United States before Belgium’s 2009 decision to restrict arms exports to Israeli military end-users. It further explains that Vredesactie considers it probable that Belgian-made replacement components have subsequently been used to maintain Israeli aircraft engines. This latter proposition remains an inference from the established supply chain and continuing aircraft maintenance requirements. The accessible reporting does not identify a particular Safran Aero Boosters shipment after October 2023, its export date, engine serial number, Israeli recipient or installation record. The evidence establishes historical participation in the F110 supply chain and a plausible continuing replacement-parts channel, but does not independently verify a particular recent Safran component reaching an operational Israeli aircraft.^{20, 21}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Military installation services

No public evidence identified of Safran providing catering, waste management, facilities management, base transportation or telecommunications services to Israeli military installations.

Military equipment sustainment

Safran markets military aerospace and defence systems and related technical capabilities, but the reviewed corporate materials do not establish a named Israeli military-base maintenance contract.^{8, 9}

Occupied-territory installations

No public evidence identified of Safran providing sustainment services to military installations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan Heights.

Shipping, freight and military cargo

No public evidence identified of Safran-specific freight-forwarding, port-handling or shipping contracts for Israeli military cargo.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

FIRE WEAVER - purpose-built targeting system

Rafael’s FIRE WEAVER is described in Safran’s September 2021 announcement as a networked sensor-to-effector system that links battlefield sensors and weapons, identifies targets, selects suitable effectors and supports coordinated precision engagement.³

The announced integration with Safran MOSKITO TI connects target-location information to that military engagement architecture.³

Because FIRE WEAVER’s described functions include target engagement and weapons-effect coordination, the named integration falls within the military targeting-system scope of this audit.³

Janes reported in 2022 that Israeli forces had acquired FIRE WEAVER in early 2020, while separately confirming that integration with Safran MOSKITO TI had been completed and demonstrated to an unidentified foreign customer.⁴

The reporting does not establish that the Israeli forces’ particular FIRE WEAVER configuration incorporated MOSKITO TI.⁴

Arrow 3 - missile-defence development equipment

Safran’s reported 2022 Israeli government order comprised telemetry reception and recording equipment intended for Arrow 3 development testing.¹

The Israeli Ministry of Defense reported Arrow 3’s first operational interception in November 2023 and identified Israel Aerospace Industries, Elbit Systems, Rafael and Tomer as industrial participants.²

The Ministry reported another Arrow weapons-system development test in August 2026, showing that the programme continued after the 2022 Safran order.²²

The 2026 announcement does not identify Safran as a participant in that particular test or establish a new Safran order.²²

Act record - Arrow 3 programme

• Acting entity: Safran, with the precise supply subsidiary unresolved.
• Recipient: Israeli government.
• Programme beneficiary: Arrow 3 missile-defence development.
• Equipment: Range Telemetry Receivers, Radio Signal Recorders and Ground Modular Data Recorders.
• Channel: Government equipment procurement.
• Earliest identified Safran-specific observation: 2022.
• Latest independent programme observation: August 2026.
• Safran supply status in 2026: Unknown.
• Interceptor component production by Safran: Not established.
• Contract value: Not established.^{1, 22}

Lethal-platform manufacturing

Safran manufactures the M88 engine used in Dassault Aviation’s Rafale combat aircraft and supplies equipment for other military aviation applications.⁸

No public evidence identified of a Safran-manufactured Rafale engine or other named Safran combat-aircraft engine being supplied to the Israeli Air Force.

Munitions and warhead components

No public evidence identified of Safran supplying explosive ordnance, ammunition, warheads or propellant materials directly to Israeli military end-users.

Iron Dome and David’s Sling

No public evidence identified of Safran-specific component supply to Iron Dome or David’s Sling.

Military AI and kinetic targeting

The documented FIRE WEAVER/MOSKITO TI integration supports a weapons-engagement process through target-location and sensor-to-effector connectivity.³

No separate Safran-developed autonomous targeting AI system supplied to the Israeli military was established.

The March 2025 Vredesactie investigation, subsequently discussed by GRIP, identifies the F110 engine manufactured by General Electric as a military aviation programme receiving components from Safran Aero Boosters. The F110 is used in configurations of the F-15 and F-16, aircraft types operated by the Israeli Air Force. This constitutes evidence of Safran group participation in the manufacture of components for combat-aircraft propulsion systems associated with Israeli military aviation. It does not establish that Safran manufactures complete F110 engines, directly supplies the Israeli Air Force or controls the subsequent allocation of completed engines by General Electric. Nor does identification of an aircraft type establish that every Israeli aircraft of that type contains a Safran-produced component.²⁰

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

United Kingdom - September 2024 suspension

On 2 September 2024, the UK government announced the suspension of certain existing export licences covering equipment assessed as potentially usable in military operations in Gaza.²³

The government notice explained that the suspension covered relevant military exports while preserving defined exceptions, including parts of the international F-35 programme.²³

In a decision published on 2 July 2025, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office documented that the Department for Business and Trade had refused to disclose the identities of exporters associated with the September 2024 suspensions. The department argued that identifying individual companies and their licences could reveal commercially sensitive trading relationships, and the Commissioner upheld the withholding of relevant information on confidentiality grounds.²⁴

Consequently, the published suspension announcement cannot establish whether any particular Safran company held one of the affected licences.^{23, 24}

Subsequent licensing disclosures

The UK government’s February 2026 licensing publication distinguishes military exports for Israeli end-use from goods intended for re-export to third countries, civilian applications and specified exempt programmes.²⁵

The published aggregate figures do not identify Safran as the holder of an approved, refused or suspended licence.²⁵

French and Swiss licensing

No public evidence identified of a named French or Swiss export-licence grant, refusal, revocation or suspension specifically covering Safran equipment supplied to Israeli defence customers.

Sanctions investigations

No public evidence identified of a sanctions-enforcement action against Safran specifically concerning military trade with Israel.

Judicial proceedings

No public evidence identified of a court judgment or judicial-review proceeding specifically finding that Safran violated export-control legislation in connection with Israeli defence procurement.

Constructive-notice chronology

The documented Sagem–Elbit agreement dates to 2010, the Safran–Rafael agreement to September 2021 and the reported Israeli Arrow 3 telemetry order to 2022.^{1, 3, 12}

The available evidence does not independently establish that any of these Safran-specific contracts was renewed after 19 July 2024 or after the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants.^{1, 3, 12}

The existence of later Arrow programme activity establishes ongoing programme development, but does not establish a continuing Safran commercial relationship.²²

French government response to the April 2026 investigation

On 9 April 2026, French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu publicly responded to scrutiny of French military exports to Israel. He maintained that France did not sell weapons to Israel and described permitted deliveries as defensive components, particularly for Iron Dome, or equipment intended for re-export to third countries, including France. He also announced that classified information concerning export licences granted in 2025 would be provided to the presidents of parliamentary defence committees. This constitutes a documented French government response to the wider export controversy. It does not specifically identify Safran Electronics & Defense, Safran Aerosystems, the three reported 2023 Elbit recipients, or the export licences governing their consignments.²⁶

The French government’s general export-control explanation cannot independently establish the permitted or actual end use of the reported Safran shipments. The accessible reporting does not identify a Safran-specific export licence, military-goods classification, dual-use authorisation, end-user certificate, re-export undertaking, customs release or regulatory determination concerning the reported gyroscopic sensors, valves, actuators or aircraft components. No source examined establishes whether the individual shipments were intended for Israeli military production, defensive systems, third-country exports or other applications. Identifying an Israeli defence manufacturer as consignee establishes a reported industrial supply relationship; it does not establish incorporation into a particular weapon, transfer to the Israel Defense Forces or operational deployment.^{17, 26, 27}

The Safran Aero Boosters–General Electric supply relationship illustrates a documented question concerning Belgian export controls on military components incorporated into completed American defence products. GRIP reports that, in April 2024, the Walloon minister-president maintained that exports to the United States could be authorised only when their ultimate end-user was known. Vredesactie’s subsequent investigation challenged the effectiveness of this approach, identifying Belgian-produced F110 components exported to an American manufacturer whose engines were subsequently incorporated into Israeli military aircraft. The regulatory distinction is material: an export licence identifying an American industrial customer does not necessarily demonstrate that the Belgian authorities have independently verified every ultimate military operator of the finished product.²⁰

In a joint civil-society statement published on 2 June 2025, Vredesactie and partner organisations reported that the United States had approved a new export authorisation in 2024 covering 50 additional F-15 aircraft for Israel and 120 replacement engines for its existing F-15 fleet. The organisations identified Safran Aero Boosters as an important supplier in the relevant engine supply chain and anticipated that additional engine orders could result in further business for the Belgian company. GRIP’s September 2025 analysis independently discussed the future F-15 procurement programme and the implications for Belgian export-authorisation decisions. These statements establish a prospective supply-chain exposure arising from American military procurement. They do not constitute evidence that Safran Aero Boosters had already received a specific purchase order, exported components for the new aircraft or supplied any of the 120 replacement engines. The actual fulfilment of the anticipated procurement remains unverified.^{20, 21}

28 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: searches concerning Safran Aero Boosters, General Electric F110 components, Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft, Belgian export authorisations, end-user declarations and the March 2025 investigation did not establish a publicly identifiable Safran-specific Belgian export-licence number, a relevant licence grant or refusal, a licence suspension, a regulatory finding against Safran, or a transaction-specific government determination that particular components had reached the Israeli Air Force. The reviewed Belgian civil-society and specialist research publications establish concerns about indirect exports but do not provide those transaction-level regulatory documents.^{20, 21}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

April 2024 action targeting Safran

Association France Palestine Solidarité reported that activists from its Paris groups and Stop Arming Israel France organised an action outside Safran’s headquarters on 9 April 2024.¹

The association published its account on 12 April 2024 and referred to Safran’s historical Elbit cooperation, its Rafael targeting-system relationship and its reported Israeli Arrow 3 telemetry procurement.¹

The publication explicitly questioned whether the proposed Sagem–Elbit joint venture had become operational or remained active.¹

Act record - organised protest

• Acting organisations: Association France Palestine Solidarité groups and Stop Arming Israel France.
• Target: Safran.
• Channel: Public demonstration and campaign publication.
• Publication domain: france-palestine.org.
• Event date: 9 April 2024.
• Publication date: 12 April 2024.
• Audience: Public visitors to the campaign website and observers of the demonstration.
• Duration of demonstration: Not established.
• Online publication: Accessible during October 2026 research.
• Corporate response: no public evidence identified.¹

Who Profits

Who Profits describes its corporate research as covering companies commercially connected to Israel’s occupation economy and maintains a searchable company database with supporting publications.¹¹

No verified Safran-specific company profile or investigation was identified in the material examined.

AFSC Investigate

AFSC Investigate describes a research methodology that combines published civil-society investigations with verification using company disclosures, government documents, industry materials and other evidence.¹⁰

The reviewed AFSC database material did not establish an additional Safran-specific Israeli military procurement contract.¹⁰

Corporate governance and controlling principals

Safran identifies Ross McInnes as Chairman of its Board and Olivier Andriès as Chief Executive Officer.²⁸

Safran’s 2025 integrated report records a French State holding of 11.72% of share capital at 31 December 2025.²⁹

The French State is the only shareholder above 10% identified in the year-end 2025 ownership information examined for this audit.²⁹

Safran’s governance information also identifies Alexandre Lahousse as a director nominated on the French State’s proposal.²⁸

His published biography records senior appointments within France’s Directorate General of Armaments, including responsibility for defence industry and subsequent deputy leadership of the organisation.³⁰

Named-principal record

• Ross McInnes - Chairman; Israeli military-channel act: no public evidence identified.
• Olivier Andriès - Chief Executive Officer; Israeli military-channel act: no public evidence identified.
• Alexandre Lahousse - Director; French armaments administration involvement documented; Israeli military-channel act: no public evidence identified.
• Fabrice Brégier - Director; Israeli military-channel act: no public evidence identified.
• Robert Peugeot - Director; Israeli military-channel act: no public evidence identified.
• French State - Shareholder holding 11.72% at year-end 2025; Israeli military-channel act attributable specifically through Safran’s shareholding: no public evidence identified.^{28, 29, 30}

Additional directors identified through Safran’s governance materials include Anne Aubert, Valérie Baudson, Anne Bouverot, Christèle Debarenne-Fievet, Pascale Dosda, Laurent Guillot, Ivan Hardouin, Guillemette Kreis, Fabienne Lecorvaisier, Patrick Pélata and Daniela Schwarzer; individual Israeli military-channel screening for these directors remains incomplete.²⁸

Corporate response

No public evidence identified of Safran issuing a specific response to the April 2024 protest, terminating the Rafael relationship, cancelling the historical Elbit agreement or announcing Israel-specific military end-use restrictions.

Post-2024 relationship status

The 2021 Rafael collaboration, 2022 Arrow 3 telemetry order and historical Sagem–Elbit proposal have distinct documentary histories, and the available evidence does not establish their continued contractual status at 26 October 2026.^{1, 3, 12}

The additional named-principal screening covered Anne Aubert (director representing employee shareholders), Valérie Baudson (independent director and chair of the Appointments and Compensation Committee), Anne Bouverot (independent director), Christèle Debarenne-Fievet (director representing employees), Pascale Dosda (director representing employee shareholders), Laurent Guillot (independent director and chair of the Audit and Risk Committee), Ivan Hardouin (director representing employees), Guillemette Kreis (French State representative), Fabienne Lecorvaisier (independent director), Patrick Pélata (lead independent director and chair of the Innovation, Technology & Climate Committee) and Daniela Schwarzer (independent director). Safran’s published governance and interim financial information establish corporate oversight responsibilities for the relevant directors. They do not attribute an individual Israeli military procurement decision, equipment transfer, financing commitment, logistical operation or other physical-support act to any of these people. Collective board membership alone does not identify the individual who authorised or executed a particular transaction.³¹

27 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: searches combining the eleven named individuals with Israel, Israeli military, IDF, Arrow 3, Rafael, Elbit, military procurement, defence exports, weapons transfers, delivery and logistical support produced no verified source establishing an attributable Israeli military-channel physical-support act. For each individual, the required act, Israeli military beneficiary and date of conduct remain unestablished. The corporate financial and governance disclosures checked establish positions and committee responsibilities but provide no individual transaction-level attribution. This finding is limited to the accessible public record and does not establish that such conduct never occurred.³¹

Independent reporting and limits of corroboration

Le Monde’s 7 April 2026 investigation provides independent journalistic examination of the organisations’ report, while Anadolu Agency and TRT Français separately reported its principal findings. The subsequent coverage corroborates the existence, publication, scope and broad allegations of the investigation. It does not constitute independent confirmation of the individual Safran transactions because those accounts largely rely on the same underlying report. Le Monde specifically identifies Safran among the companies named and describes components entering Israeli defence-industry supply chains. Its article provides detailed responses from Thales and Aubert & Duval but does not reproduce an equivalent Safran-specific statement concerning the reported 2023 deliveries.^{17, 18, 19}

27 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: searches for Safran Electronics & Defense, Safran Aerosystems, Elbit Systems C4I and Cyber, Elop, Elbit Systems Land and Elisra, combined with gyroscopic sensors, shipping records, Domérat, Roche-la-Molière, customs declarations, export licences, corporate responses and the April 2026 investigation, did not identify a transaction-specific public confirmation or denial from Safran or Elbit Systems. Nor was an independently authenticated airway bill, consignee receipt, installation record or operational end-use record identified. The absence of these materials in the reviewed public reporting does not establish that the transactions did not occur.^{17, 18, 19, 26}

Additional Safran-related physical-supply reporting, 2023–2026

A June 2025 investigation titled Coopération France–Israël, published by the Observatoire des armements, reported identifying two transfers of Safran/Snecma Mexico aircraft-engine parts to Israel, dated 13 June 2022 and 20 October 2023. It further reported that Safran did not answer its questions concerning the Israeli relationship. The October 2023 transfer falls within the present audit’s approximately three-year review period and constitutes a separate reported physical-equipment channel beyond the previously documented Arrow 3 telemetry order and Rafael targeting-system integration. The accessible indexed account does not independently establish the Israeli consignee, aircraft type, quantity, customs classification, subsequent installation or military end user. The 2022 transfer is relevant historical context but falls outside the principal recent-review period.³²

27 October 2026 - no further independently verified Safran-specific supply transaction identified: searches covering additional Safran group deliveries, military equipment, components, technical services, Israeli defence manufacturers, Israeli military end users and the period October 2023–October 2026 did not establish another transaction with sufficient identifying particulars beyond the Safran Electronics & Defense shipments, Safran Aerosystems shipments and reported Snecma Mexico transfer described above. The April 2026 report identifies further French exporters, but those companies’ transactions cannot automatically be attributed to Safran. No verified additional Safran-specific military maintenance, installation, training or logistical service contract with an Israeli recipient was identified.^{17, 18, 19, 32}

On 12 March 2025, Vredesactie published research by Hans Lammerant concerning Belgian-manufactured components in Israeli combat aircraft. The investigation was associated with RTBF’s investigative television programme examining Walloon arms exports, broadcast on 12 March 2025. The investigation identified Safran Aero Boosters as a supplier of components for General Electric’s F110 engines used in military aircraft operated by Israel. Its central allegation concerned the limitations of export controls when Belgian components are supplied to American manufacturers before being incorporated into completed military equipment. GRIP’s independently published analysis of 11 September 2025 explicitly identifies the Vredesactie investigation, the RTBF programme and the Safran Aero Boosters–General Electric component relationship. This provides independent specialist corroboration of the documented investigation and the industrial supply-chain particulars, although it does not independently authenticate individual recent shipments.²⁰

On 2 June 2025, Vredesactie, Pax Christi Vlaanderen and other Belgian organisations published a joint appeal demanding stronger controls on indirect military exports to Israel. The organisations specifically identified Safran Aero Boosters as an important supplier in the engine supply chain associated with existing and future Israeli F-15 aircraft. Vredesactie researcher Hans Lammerant publicly argued that Belgian-made components were present in Israeli combat aircraft and warned that new American engine procurement could generate additional orders for Belgian suppliers. The statement also recorded the position attributed collectively to Belgian companies: because they supply American or British industrial customers, they argue that they cannot necessarily know whether their products will ultimately reach Israel. This is a reported industry position, rather than an independently authenticated, company-specific statement issued by Safran Aero Boosters.²¹

28 October 2026 - no independently verified Safran-specific response identified: searches for statements by Safran SA, Safran Aero Boosters, General Electric, RTBF and Belgian authorities concerning the March 2025 disclosures did not establish an accessible, attributable Safran response confirming or denying the incorporation of particular components into Israeli military engines. Nor was a company-specific statement establishing revised Israeli end-use restrictions, termination of the F110 relationship or cancellation of anticipated replacement-parts orders identified. The available civil-society statement attributes an end-user-visibility argument to Belgian companies collectively; it cannot establish Safran’s precise response to the investigation.^{20, 21}

29 October 2026 - correction to the preceding “28 October 2026” statement that no attributable Safran response was identified: the VRT NWS English-language article of 12 March 2025 reports that Safran Aero Boosters responded in writing to RTBF’s report. According to that article, the company said it had “merely fulfilled its obligation towards its US partner for the supply of parts for the F110 engine” and stressed that “military activities account for only 5% the company’s production”. The same article states that the parts in question are engine parts produced by Safran Aero Boosters in Herstal, near Liège, that they were used in F-15 fighter jets, that Safran Aero Boosters had written on its website that it was collaborating on the F110 “the type of engine used in amongst other planes the F-15”, and that the Walloon regional authority owns one third of the company with the remaining two thirds owned by the French company Safran. The article reports the allegation and the company’s written response; it does not itself verify individual shipments, dates or quantities, and the response does not deny the incorporation of the parts. This paragraph supersedes the earlier statement that no attributable Safran response exists; the statement in the preceding paragraph that the available civil-society statement cannot establish Safran’s response remains accurate only for the civil-society sources it cites.³³