El Al DIGITAL

Evidence cutoff: 25 October 2026

Target: El Al Israel Airlines Ltd.

Scope: Enterprise technology, digital supply chains, cybersecurity, cloud infrastructure, passenger-data processing, biometrics, general-purpose AI, technology-related state contracts, corporate control and relevant regulatory disclosures.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Palo Alto Networks - enterprise cybersecurity

A Palo Alto Networks customer case study published in the 2024–2025 period identifies El Al as a customer of Unit 42 Managed Detection and Response, using Cortex XDR for security monitoring, threat hunting and incident response across its international operations.¹

The documented implementation covers approximately 5,500 endpoints across 55 locations and provides continuous security monitoring; the supplier reports that implementation took approximately three weeks and reduced mean time to respond to four minutes.¹

Palo Alto Networks identifies Chen Amram, El Al’s Director of Security and Infrastructure, as a customer representative discussing the implementation.¹

The relationship concerns a substantial enterprise cybersecurity function, including endpoint protection, monitoring and response capabilities, and the vendor case study describes an operational deployment rather than a proposed procurement.¹

Microsoft, Commvault and WeAnkor

On 16 September 2025, Israeli systems integrator WeAnkor published a case study confirming implementation of Commvault Cloud, powered by Metallic AI, for the protection of El Al’s Microsoft 365 environment.²

The implementation reportedly covers approximately 5,000 users and protects Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, calendars and contact data through backup, recovery and ransomware-protection services.²

The integrator describes Microsoft Azure as El Al’s primary platform for data storage and application operations, while reporting that further Commvault protection of Azure applications was under consideration.²

WeAnkor’s published case-study archive dates the El Al implementation announcement to 16 September 2025.³

A separate commercial technographic database lists Microsoft 365, Microsoft SharePoint and Genesys Cloud CX among technologies attributed to El Al; its historical product dates are secondary claims and do not independently establish the current state of every listed deployment.⁴

Amadeus Passenger Service System

El Al’s 2024 periodic report identifies Amadeus Passenger Service System as the platform used for passenger bookings, flight inventory management and check-in.⁵

The company states that Amadeus supports its updated flight schedule, sales centres, ticket issuance, online bookings and passenger-service management, and identifies material operational dependence on the provider.⁵

The annual report states that the Amadeus agreement was effective until the end of 2025, with an option to extend until the end of 2027; whether that option was exercised is not established by the 2024 document.⁵

[pre-2020] The Israel Airline Museum records that El Al replaced its Carmel reservation system with Amadeus in April 2008; the 2024 report separately confirms that Amadeus remained in operational use during 2024.⁶

SpaceX Starlink - aircraft connectivity

On 15 June 2026, El Al announced an agreement for Starlink high-speed satellite internet, with introduction planned during 2027 and no disclosed contract value.⁷

October 2026 coverage continued to describe Starlink as a future aircraft-connectivity upgrade, confirming the distinction between the signed agreement and the planned service rollout.⁸

Other Israeli-origin enterprise vendors

No public evidence identified establishing a specific El Al procurement or deployment relationship with Check Point, Wiz, CyberArk, SentinelOne, NICE, Verint or Claroty in the examined enterprise vendor disclosures and supplier case studies.^{1, 2, 4, 5}

First-half 2026 cybersecurity threats and enhanced defensive measures

In its interim financial report for the six months ended 30 June 2026, published on 5 August 2026, El Al disclosed an increase in attempted cyberattacks during the first half of 2026, identifying phishing, impersonation of El Al and its employees, and attempts to damage its corporate reputation as principal attack methods.⁹

El Al reported heightened cybersecurity measures, including continuous monitoring, strengthened defensive systems, enhanced network and email identification and filtering technologies, and refreshed information-security guidance for employees and suppliers.⁹

The disclosure describes attempted attacks and the company’s defensive response but does not quantify the attempts, establish successful compromise or identify specific technologies or suppliers responsible for the enhanced controls.⁹

As of 25 October 2026, company-controlled records confirm that El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. had implemented customer-facing digital booking and mobile services for passengers in Israel and overseas. In its 2024 periodic report, published in March 2025, El Al identifies its website and mobile application as operational direct-sales channels and confirms that customers could book flights, purchase ancillary services, modify reservations, redeem frequent-flyer points and hold bookings for 48 hours. The company specifically states that, since December 2024, customers had been able to cancel flight tickets through both its website and mobile application. Its report also identifies sales desks at Israeli airports and an Israeli travel-agent distribution channel. The operator is El Al, the users include Israeli passengers and travel agents, and the downstream services are passenger reservations, ticket issuance, booking management and associated airline operations. These disclosures establish implemented services available to users in Israel before the cutoff, although they do not quantify Israeli digital-service users or transaction volumes separately. This provides affirmative operational evidence relevant to excluded frame v_dig:7aa77a85ceb6.¹⁰

El Al’s 2024 periodic report identifies passenger-data processing as an integral operational function of its airline services. Section 7.6.2 states that its contracted Amadeus Passenger Service System performs reservations, flight-inventory management and passenger check-in, supports ticket issuance through company sales and service centres and the website, and enables management of aircraft capacity through weight-and-balance calculations. El Al expressly identifies material operational dependence on Amadeus. The company also reports agreements with Amadeus, Cyber and Travelport distribution systems interfacing with its reservations platform to permit travel agents in Israel and overseas to sell El Al flights. Consequently, the documented service requires operational processing of passenger, reservation and flight information across direct and intermediary distribution channels. The disclosed Amadeus contract ran through the end of 2025 with an extension option through 2027; the report does not establish whether that option was subsequently exercised.¹⁰

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Aviation security surveillance

Provision-ISR publishes an El Al surveillance privacy notice, updated in September 2023, describing the collection of static and moving imagery, audio and metadata through CCTV associated with vehicles operating around aircraft at Heathrow.¹¹

The notice describes collection of vehicle-registration information and security-related processing, including possible disclosures for security, law-enforcement and aviation-protection purposes.¹¹

The published notice describes retention periods normally extending up to 96 hours, with longer retention in specified circumstances, including certain automatic-number-plate-recognition records.¹¹

The existence of CCTV and vehicle-data collection is established by the notice; the publication does not itself establish that El Al uses facial recognition or biometric identification from AnyVision/Oosto, BriefCam, Trigo or Trax.¹¹

Passenger identification systems

El Al’s online check-in service accepts ticket or booking references and passenger surnames and provides additional identification routes using frequent-flyer details and account credentials.¹²

These functions demonstrate passenger identification and authentication through the airline’s online systems but do not independently identify the supplier of any airport biometric-processing service.¹²

Predictive analytics and monitoring

In December 2025, El Al infrastructure executive Chen Amram described operational AI applications involving predicted passenger no-shows, aircraft fuel optimisation, maintenance and customer-service development.¹³

Those documented applications concern civilian airline operations; the cited interview does not establish procurement of predictive-policing, social-media surveillance or workforce-monitoring products.¹³

Third-party biometric deployment

No public evidence identified confirming that a named Israeli-origin facial-recognition or behavioural-surveillance product is indirectly deployed for El Al through a managed-service provider or airport contractor in the examined surveillance and passenger-processing records.^{11, 12}

El Al’s publicly accessible online check-in interface independently confirms an implemented passenger-facing identification and transaction workflow. Customers can access reservations using a 13-digit ticket number or six-character booking code and surname, or authenticate through the Matmid frequent-flyer programme using a membership number or nine-digit Israeli identity number, with password or email/SMS verification options. The interface advertises seat selection, additional baggage, boarding-pass downloads and check-in cancellation. It expressly identifies flights departing Tel Aviv among those eligible for associated airport facilities, including baggage-tag printing and dedicated processing arrangements. The evidence establishes an operational digital service incorporating Israeli identity credentials and passenger booking records, but does not independently establish that every advertised function was successfully completed by a particular passenger before the cutoff.¹⁴

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Microsoft Azure

WeAnkor’s September 2025 implementation case study identifies Azure as El Al’s principal platform for data storage and application operations.²

The disclosed enterprise environment includes Microsoft 365 collaboration applications, approximately 5,000 covered users and Commvault Cloud backup and recovery services.²

The supplier also identifies El Al’s migration towards SaaS applications and describes potential expansion of backup protection for Azure-hosted systems, including file storage, website infrastructure and other applications.²

The implementation announcement does not specify the precise Azure regions, storage locations, encryption-key custody arrangements or backup-data residency applicable to every El Al workload.²

Personal-data processing and jurisdiction

El Al’s 2024 ESG report identifies a corporate privacy governance structure, including a Data Protection Officer, privacy steering arrangements, internal audits and board oversight.¹⁵

The company reports that its privacy programme includes third-party data-processing agreements, security assessments and procedures for responding to data-subject requests.¹⁵

El Al’s booking and check-in systems process identifiable booking and passenger information, with the publicly accessible check-in interface requesting ticket references, surnames and frequent-flyer credentials.¹²

The supplier evidence establishes that customer-facing and enterprise information systems operate within El Al’s technology estate but does not identify the physical processing location of every database or whether each workload remains entirely within Israeli jurisdiction.^{2, 12, 15}

Government cloud and Project Nimbus

Israel’s Government Procurement Administration identifies Project Nimbus as a government cloud programme initiated in 2019 with the involvement of the Ministry of Finance, Israel National Digital Agency, National Cyber Directorate, Ministry of Defence and Israel Defense Forces.¹⁶

The official programme description identifies Amazon Web Services and Google as selected suppliers for the government’s principal public-cloud procurement layer.¹⁶

No public evidence identified naming El Al as a contracted Nimbus cloud supplier or confirming that its commercial Azure environment provides Nimbus services.^{2, 16}

Data-centre operations and sovereign services

No public evidence identified that El Al commercially operates a sovereign-cloud platform, markets data-residency services to Israeli government institutions or supplies dedicated government cloud infrastructure.^{2, 16}

The supplier documents establish cloud consumption and enterprise data protection but do not specify ownership or operation of a separate El Al commercial data-centre business.^{2, 4}

As of 25 October 2026, El Al’s own corporate disclosure establishes a specific Israeli legal-access mechanism applicable to passenger and crew data. Section 8.11.2(k) of its 2024 periodic report identifies Israel’s Powers of Collection and Analysis of Data of Passengers Arriving in or Departing from Israel Law, 5783-2023. El Al states that the legislation obliges the company, following a demand from competent authorities exercising statutory powers, to provide passenger and crew information concerning flights it operates. The relevant actors are El Al as airline operator and holder of operational passenger information, and the competent Israeli authorities as legally authorised recipients. The documented pipeline is airline collection of operational passenger and crew data followed by legally compelled disclosure upon a qualifying demand. This confirms Israeli legal accessibility of relevant information and is affirmative evidence concerning excluded frame v_dig:cf6ff5d054fa. The disclosure does not identify individual demands, actual transfers, receiving agencies, database locations or continuous governmental access.¹⁰

As of 25 October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the examined El Al corporate report, passenger check-in interface and Amadeus product documentation do not establish the physical jurisdiction of El Al’s passenger reservation databases, the geographic routing of booking or identity records, the Azure region containing passenger information, the location of encryption keys, or the specific jurisdictions in which Amadeus processes El Al passenger records. El Al confirms operational dependence on Amadeus, while Amadeus describes the functional architecture of its passenger-service products; neither examined disclosure establishes an El Al-specific Israeli hosting configuration. Israeli corporate control, employee location, passenger-service availability and statutory disclosure obligations therefore provide distinct forms of evidence and do not independently establish Israeli physical data residency.^{10, 14, 17}

The confirmed passenger-data categories and operational breadth can be distinguished from unverified infrastructure geography. El Al’s live check-in interface demonstrates processing of ticket identifiers, booking references, surnames, frequent-flyer identifiers, Israeli identity numbers, authentication credentials and email or telephone verification information. Its annual report establishes connected reservation, ticketing, flight-inventory, passenger check-in and international distribution functions, with both direct customer interfaces and travel-agent access in Israel and overseas. Amadeus separately describes its Altéa Passenger Service System as supporting reservation, inventory, ticketing, departure control, customer identification and digital passenger interactions. These records establish that personal-data collection and processing are core operational requirements of the relevant passenger-service functions; they do not establish El Al-specific storage of every listed data category, the processing of complete payment-card credentials by Amadeus, or the physical hosting location of individual records.^{10, 14, 17}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Civilian airline and security operations

El Al’s 2024 ESG report describes the company as an Israeli national transport operator that maintained passenger and essential cargo services during the war beginning in October 2023.¹⁵

The same report describes company support for organisations associated with Israeli military personnel, injured soldiers and their families, including reservist travel benefits extending into 2025.¹⁵

These disclosures concern airline operations and organisational support rather than a demonstrated contract for supplying digital military technology.¹⁵

Technology provision to state-security bodies

No public evidence identified of a specific El Al contract to provide cybersecurity platforms, cloud services, communications infrastructure or intelligence-analysis software to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF or intelligence agencies in the examined corporate, procurement and vendor records.^{5, 15, 16}

The Project Nimbus documentation identifies the IDF and Ministry of Defence among participating government institutions but does not list El Al as a cloud infrastructure supplier.¹⁶

Passenger-data disclosure and national authorities

El Al’s published passenger-processing systems collect identifiable booking information, while the company’s privacy and surveillance materials describe legally authorised security-related processing and disclosure arrangements.^{11, 12, 15}

The existence of data collection and legally permitted disclosure is distinct from proof of a particular transfer of passenger records to an intelligence agency, which is not established by those documents.^{11, 12}

Offensive cyber and weapons systems

No public evidence identified of El Al developing, licensing, maintaining or selling offensive cyber exploits, surveillance malware, military fire-control software or purpose-built kinetic targeting systems in the corporate and technology-supplier records examined.^{1, 2, 5, 15}

The documented Palo Alto Networks relationship concerns defensive monitoring of El Al’s own infrastructure through a commercial cybersecurity provider.¹

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Operational artificial intelligence

In a 3 December 2025 interview, El Al’s Director of Infrastructure and Computing described AI use for passenger no-show forecasting, fuel optimisation, aircraft maintenance prediction and customer-service technology.¹³

The executive also discussed technical work on customer-service bots and problems associated with simultaneous Hebrew and English speech recognition.¹³

The reported applications concern passenger operations, aircraft efficiency and customer support rather than verified provision of AI systems to military customers.¹³

Ella AI customer assistant

October 2026 reporting identifies Ella as an AI-powered El Al customer-service assistant intended to handle initial questions, retrieve booking information, assist with customer actions and direct passengers to human service personnel.¹⁸

The same reporting describes an upgraded in-flight entertainment interface using passenger preferences, account access and viewing-history continuity to personalise the experience.¹⁸

Ynet’s October 2026 coverage independently describes the Ella assistant and the company’s new mobile-app travel mode and passenger notification capabilities.⁸

AI-generated passenger communications

El Al’s September 2026 in-flight magazine reported that the airline introduced destination-specific safety-video content produced using artificial intelligence technology in collaboration with Samsung.¹⁹

The reported system supports the production and adaptation of different safety-video versions for selected destinations; the publication does not establish that the system performs passenger identification or military surveillance.¹⁹

Future personalisation

In a company statement published during 2025, El Al described plans to use AI to improve and personalise customer interactions before, during and after flights.²⁰

That statement establishes the company’s stated development direction without specifying a completed technology architecture or identifying the hosting jurisdiction of any associated AI models.²⁰

Training data and military AI

No public evidence identified establishing that El Al trains AI models on intercepted communications, surveillance-derived population datasets or military intelligence records in the examined operational and customer-service AI publications.^{13, 18, 19}

No public evidence identified of El Al providing autonomous target generation, weapons tracking or purpose-built kinetic decision-support systems to Israeli military forces.^{13, 16, 18}

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Technology development and operating footprint

El Al maintains an internal infrastructure and information-security function, with named technical management publicly discussing enterprise cybersecurity, operational AI and digital passenger-service development during 2024–2026.^{1, 13}

The 2025 Commvault case study identifies direct participation by El Al’s infrastructure and information-security personnel in enterprise technology implementation alongside an external Israeli integrator.²

The December 2025 interview identifies internal work on AI customer-service capabilities, although it does not quantify the company’s AI engineering workforce or identify a separate research laboratory.¹³

Corporate control - Eli Zachary Rozenberg

UK Companies House identifies Eli Rozenberg as a beneficial owner of El Al Israel Airlines Limited with more than 25% of shares and voting rights in the relevant ownership filing.²¹

An original Tel Aviv Stock Exchange interested-party disclosure dated 4 October 2020 records his Hebrew name as אלי זכריה רוזנברג and expressly renders his English name as Eli Zachary Rozenberg.²²

The October 2020 filing identifies Kanfei Nesharim Aviation Ltd. as an Israeli private company wholly owned and controlled by Eli Zachary Rozenberg and records the relevant consent for the company to hold shares conferring control of El Al.²²

A further Tel Aviv Stock Exchange disclosure dated 27 January 2025 again identifies the shareholder in its English-name field as Eli Zachary Rozenberg.²³

The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange’s interested-party holdings report filed on 7 July 2026, concerning holdings as at 30 June 2026, also identifies Eli Zachary Rozenberg using that English spelling.²⁴

The company’s 2024 periodic report identifies Eli Rozenberg as the controlling shareholder through Kanfei Nesharim Aviation Ltd., while its English translation also uses the variant “Eli Zechariah Rozenberg” in the corporate-control discussion.⁵

El Al’s September 2025 interim financial report uses “Eli Zachary Rozenberg”, matching the explicit English-name fields in the original securities disclosures.^{25, 22, 23, 24}

Globes’ shareholder information, updated on 23 October 2026, reports Eli Zachary Rozenberg holding approximately 42.25% of El Al’s issued equity.²⁶

Corporate control - Kenneth Neal Rozenberg

UK Companies House records Kenneth Neal Rozenberg as a director of El Al Israel Airlines Limited, company FC004087, appointed on 20 May 2021.²⁷

The Companies House filing-history record also identifies the appointment as that of Kenneth Neal Rozenberg, correcting the spelling “Kenneth Neil Rozenberg” previously used in the audit’s description of the company’s directors.^{28, 27}

El Al’s 2024 periodic report identifies Kenneth Neal Rozenberg as a deputy chairman and describes the control-permit arrangements involving him and his son Eli Zachary Rozenberg.⁵

The September 2025 interim report again identifies Kenneth Neal Rozenberg and Eli Zachary Rozenberg as the relevant permit holders and records an amendment to the control permission dated 28 October 2025.²⁵

The same interim report describes a 30 October 2025 agreement involving chairman Amikam Ben Zvi and the Rozenberg family under which Ben Zvi could acquire 15% of the rights in the controlling shareholder, subject to regulatory approvals and other conditions; the report does not establish subsequent completion.²⁵

A separate October 2025 report also identifies Kenneth and Eli Rozenberg and their associated holding vehicles in connection with a revised shareholding-control permission.²⁹

Other directors and governance

UK Companies House records published during 2025 identify directors including Kenneth Neal Rozenberg, Jason Greenblatt, Yitzhak Levy, Yaacov Sheinenzon and Yifat Samet Shalit, alongside other registered officers.^{28, 27}

A third-party company profile separately identifies additional board members and reports Eli Zachary Rozenberg as the largest shareholder.³⁰

Principal investments

The examined ownership and corporate-governance sources establish equity control, board positions and the Kanfei Nesharim holding structure, but no public evidence identified in those sources confirms personal investments by El Al’s controlling shareholders in NSO Group, Cellebrite, Carbyne, AnyVision/Oosto, Wiz, Palantir, Check Point or comparable surveillance and military-AI companies.^{21, 26, 29, 28, 30, 25, 22}

Strategic technology investments and acquisitions

No public evidence identified establishing an El Al acquisition of a named Israeli surveillance, cybersecurity or military-AI company in the examined corporate ownership and technology-partnership records.^{5, 29, 30}

No public evidence identified establishing a material patent-licensing or joint-development agreement between El Al and Technion, Hebrew University or the Weizmann Institute for surveillance, cyber or military-AI systems in the examined technology disclosures.^{4, 5, 13}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

Civil-society and settlement-related research

Who Profits maintains a database of companies investigated for involvement in the occupation economy, including technology and international travel-platform companies.³¹

The general database material examined did not establish a specific El Al technology deployment within an Israeli settlement or a specific technology-related transaction with a settlement organisation.³¹

No public evidence identified of a technology-specific El Al investigation concerning settlement surveillance infrastructure in the examined civil-society database and company technology disclosures.^{1, 15, 31}

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of a campaign specifically addressing the provision of surveillance software, cloud platforms or military-AI technology by El Al in the examined company disclosures and civil-society material.^{15, 31}

That evidence limitation concerns technology provision specifically and does not establish the absence of broader political or commercial boycott activity relating to the airline.^{15, 31}

Regulatory compliance and privacy

El Al’s 2024 ESG report states that its board approved an information-security policy covering personal-data protection and that cybersecurity and privacy risks were subject to regular governance review.¹⁵

The company reported zero documented cybersecurity incidents, data leaks or suspected privacy violations in its 2024 ESG metrics; these are company-reported figures rather than independently verified incident totals.¹⁵

The surveillance privacy notice published through Provision-ISR describes UK GDPR obligations associated with CCTV and surveillance data collected in the Heathrow aviation environment.¹¹

Passenger-data processing for government authorities

El Al’s health-declaration interface states that specified COVID-19 personal information was collected at the request of United States authorities, with passengers informed about onward transfer.³²

This statement documents a historical example of airline passenger information being collected for a government authority, without establishing an Israeli military or intelligence technology contract.³²

Technology-specific legal actions

No public evidence identified of export-control enforcement, sanctions proceedings or regulatory penalties arising from El Al’s sale of offensive cyber tools, military-AI technology or settlement surveillance systems in the examined regulatory, company and supplier records.^{1, 5, 11, 15}