Shell Energy MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Scope and entity map. “Shell Energy” appears in the retrieved sources as a brand: the UK consumer business Shell Energy Retail Limited was acquired by Shell on 28 February 2018 [pre-2020] and rebranded Shell Energy in March 2019, and Octopus Energy Group completed its purchase on 1 December 2023, buying from Impello Limited, a subsidiary of Shell Petroleum Company Limited ^{1, 2}.

Companies House shows Shell New Energies Holding Limited notified as a person with significant control of Shell Energy UK Limited from 3 July 2023, the date Shell Energy Retail Limited ceased to be one ³.

Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (ABN 28 122 259 223) is named as the copyright holder of the Shell Energy Australia site, which lists business electricity, gas, environmental products and the Powershop residential brand, and the page does not mention Israel or defence ⁴.

The Israel-related allegations located name Shell plc or Shell upstream units, not a Shell Energy entity, so Shell plc is treated here as the integrated parent group ^{5, 6, 7}.

Contracts and tenders. No public evidence identified of any contract, tender award, framework agreement or memorandum of understanding between Shell plc, Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd, Shell Energy UK Limited or Shell Energy Retail Limited and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the IDF, the Israel Prison Service or the Israel Border Police in the pages retrieved ^{5, 6, 8, 7}.

AFSC’s profile of Shell plc (valid as of 10 September 2025) says Bazan, Delek, Paz and Sonol are major fuel suppliers to the Israeli military and that Paz has a contract to supply jet fuel to the Israeli air force, but it does not show that Shell’s oil reaches military or settlement fuel supplies ⁵.

The SOMO jet-fuel briefing (published 28 May 2024), as summarised by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, says Paz Aviation reportedly refuels Israeli military aircraft at seven Air Force bases under an Israeli Ministry of Defence contract, and it logs Shell only as a non-response dated 10 September 2024 ⁸.

Third-party reported chain (May 2026). Greenpeace Italia’s press release on its investigation with Rai 3 “Report” says Eni stated that one of three crude shipments from the Eni-run Taranto terminal toward Israel was handled by Shell, and that Paz, which the release says has supply contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence or air force, was the destination of two of the three ^{7, 9}. The release does not name the buyer or the date of the Shell-handled cargo, and none of the retrieved pages says whether that cargo went to Paz, Bazan or another company ^{7, 10, 11}.

Defence trade directories. No public evidence identified that Shell plc or any Shell Energy entity appears in SIBAT directories, defence exhibition catalogues or Israeli state procurement registries in the pages retrieved ^{5, 8}.

Press releases and partnerships. No public evidence identified of a press release, joint venture or partnership between a Shell Energy entity and an Israeli defence entity in the pages retrieved ^{5, 1, 2}.

Named-entity record (one line per name).

• Shell plc, parent of the group: searched on Israel, fuel supply to the Israeli military and the occupied territories; the finding is that NGO analyses name it as an upstream crude producer with an estimated 5% share of Israel’s crude, and that Greenpeace Italia reports an Eni statement that Shell handled one Taranto cargo, with no contract identified ^{5, 12, 6, 7}.
• Shell E&P Italia S.p.A., holder of 25% of the Tempa Rossa joint venture per the Greenpeace text: searched on Israel and Taranto; the finding is the Eni statement that one of three cargoes was handled by Shell, and Shell did not reply; a 2012 trade page also gives Shell a 25% Tempa Rossa interest [pre-2020] ^{7, 11, 13}.
• TotalEnergies EP Italia S.p.A., 50% holder in the Tempa Rossa joint venture per Greenpeace: told Report it was not involved in the cited shipments ^{7, 10}.
• Mitsui E&P Italia B S.r.l., 25% holder in the Tempa Rossa joint venture per Greenpeace: searched on the same topics, none found beyond the ownership line, and the 2012 trade page does not mention Mitsui ^{11, 13}.
• Eni, operator of the Taranto terminal: said it acted only as terminal operator ^{7, 11}.
• Thenamaris, reported owner of the tanker Seasalvia: searched, the only finding is the ownership statement in a 26 September 2025 report ¹⁴.
• Shell Petroleum Company Limited, parent of Impello Limited: searched on the same topics; the only finding is its role as seller’s parent in the 1 December 2023 Octopus sale, and no defence link was found ².
• Impello Limited, the seller of Shell Energy Retail to Octopus: searched on the same topics; the only finding is its role as seller on 1 December 2023, and no defence link was found ².
• Shell New Energies Holding Limited, person with significant control of Shell Energy UK Limited from 3 July 2023: searched on the same topics, none found ³.
• Shell Energy UK Limited (company 07489042): searched on the same topics, none found ³.
• Shell Energy Retail Limited, sold to Octopus on 1 December 2023: searched on the same topics, none found ^{1, 2}.
• Shell Energy Operations Pty Ltd (Australia): searched on the same topics, none found; its site does not mention Israel or defence ⁴.
• Octopus Energy Group, buyer of the UK and German retail business: searched only for its role as acquirer, and the retrieved page records the 1 December 2023 completion ².
• BG Great Britain Limited, the Shell affiliate named as seller of the Gaza Marine interest in April 2018: searched on defence topics, none found beyond the energy-licence divestment ^{15, 16}.
• Wael Sawan (Chief Executive) and Sir Andrew Mackenzie (Chair): searched on Israel, Gaza, IDF and defence topics; the retrieved AFSC and BHRRC pages name no individual director or executive, and no military-channel act was identified ^{5, 6}.
• Holders of 10% or more of Shell plc: no public evidence identified in the pages retrieved, which show only intra-group holders (Shell New Energies Holding Limited, Impello Limited) ^{3, 2}.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Militarised product lines. No public evidence identified that Shell plc or any Shell Energy entity markets ruggedised, tactical or mil-spec variants of its products to Israeli security forces; the retail and wholesale energy services described for Shell Energy Australia and the former UK consumer business are civilian offerings ^{1, 4}.

Civilian-to-military distinction. The only fuel-to-military links in the retrieved material run through Israeli refiners and distributors (Bazan, Delek, Paz, Sonol), and AFSC states no page-level evidence that Shell’s oil specifically reaches military fuel supplies, so military supply is not inferred from crude-oil availability ⁵.

Greenpeace Italia reports a buyer-level link rather than a product variant: it says Bazan and Paz have supply contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence or air force, and that the crude involved at Taranto was ordinary Tempa Rossa crude, with no purpose-built military specification described ^{7, 9}.

Export licensing and end-user certificates. No public evidence identified of export licence applications, end-user certificates or export-control reviews for Shell sales to Israeli defence or security end-users in the pages retrieved ^{5, 8}.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment in occupied territories. No public evidence identified of Shell equipment, vehicles or machinery used in settlements, the separation barrier or military installations in the pages retrieved ^{5, 6}.

Construction and engineering contracts. No public evidence identified of Shell contracts for checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier or settlement infrastructure in the pages retrieved ^{5, 6}.

Settlement nexus. AFSC says Delek, Paz and Sonol operate fuel stations including in Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, and it makes no such statement about Shell ⁵.

Gaza Marine licence (energy infrastructure, not a military supply act) [pre-2020]. BG Group and the Consolidated Contractors Company signed a memorandum of intent on 8 November 1999, and Shell acquired BG on 8 April 2016 ¹⁷. A Middle East Economic Survey item of 6 June 2005 gives BG Group a 90% interest as operator and CCC the remaining 10% ¹⁸.

• Reported stake in 2017 to 2018: sources disagree, and no retrieved page reconciles them; Shell’s interest was put at 55% by Al Jazeera (6 March 2018), the New Arab (5 March 2018), MEES (30 March 2018) and Middle East Eye (5 April 2018), at 60% (with the Palestinian Authority at 40%) by Globes (8 March 2018), and at 90% in reports of Shell’s 4 April 2018 divestment announcement ^{19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 15, 24, 25}.
• Acting entity: BG Great Britain Limited, described as a Shell affiliate, is named as the seller by Offshore Energy (4 April 2018), Longdown EIC and a law-firm deal note dated 6 April 2018, so the exact legal entity is now identified from trade-press and deal-note sources rather than from a Shell page ^{15, 24, 16}.
• Recipient or counterpart: the Palestine Investment Fund; Natural Gas World reports Shell’s “entire 90% interest and operatorship” divested to it, equity transferred at signing, and the deal note says PIF received rights for 90% of the licence after completion ^{25, 24, 16}. No retrieved page gives a price ^{15, 24, 16}.
• Shell’s statements: on 6 March 2018 a spokesperson said “As of now, Shell continues to hold its equity in the Gaza Marine asset”, and on 4 April 2018 Shell said the deal was consistent with its strategy to “high-grade and simplify our portfolio” ^{19, 24}.
• Post-sale structure: PIF and its partner each to hold 27.5% of development rights with a future international operator holding 45% ^{15, 22}.
• Channel: Natural Gas World, Offshore Energy, Longdown EIC, Al Jazeera and the other outlets named above, not a Shell page retrieved in this run ^{19, 25, 15, 24}.
• Earliest and latest dated observations: 1999 (BG memorandum) to 6 April 2018 (deal note on completion) ^{17, 16}.
• Status: ended per the April 2018 divestment reports; Wikipedia says that in 2023 PIF and CCC each held 27.5% and Egypt’s EGAS consortium 45% ^{17, 16}.

Reported Leviathan gas talks (energy trade, not defence) [pre-2020]. The New Arab (21 August 2017) reported Shell in talks, citing Bloomberg, to buy about 5 billion cubic metres a year from Israeli suppliers for Egypt’s gas plants, and the article carries no Shell statement ²⁶.

• Acting entity: Shell, with the legal entity unspecified; counterparts named as Leviathan partners Noble Energy and Delek Drilling ²⁶.
• Channel: The New Arab and The Algemeiner, with Bloomberg as the original source ^{27, 26}.
• Earliest and latest observation: August 2017; no later confirmation of a signed supply arrangement was found ^{27, 26, 28}.
• Status: unknown; GEM.wiki records only plans and considerations, not a confirmed arrangement ²⁸.

Related holdings. GEM.wiki lists Shell PLC at 35.5% of Idku Train 1 and 38.0% of Train 2 and reports Shell’s 35% in Cyprus’s Aphrodite field ²⁸.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Component supply, categories, joint development. No public evidence identified of Shell plc or any Shell Energy entity supplying components, sub-systems or materials to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael or IMI/Elbit Land, or of joint development or co-production agreements with them, in the pages retrieved ^{5, 29}.

The Albanese report coverage reviewed names Elbit Systems and IAI among arms companies; it does not name Shell ^{30, 29}.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Service contracts to installations. No public evidence identified of Shell contracts for catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, maintenance or telecommunications to IDF bases, training facilities or detention centres ^{5, 8}.

Geographic specificity. The documented military jet-fuel arrangement concerns Paz Aviation at seven Air Force bases under an Israeli Ministry of Defence contract, with no Shell role stated ⁸.

Shipping, freight and port services. The SOMO jet-fuel briefing names Valero Energy as the alleged JP-8 supplier (shipments from Corpus Christi to Ashkelon, late September 2023 to early March 2024) and Overseas Shipholding Group as carrier, and neither is a Shell entity ⁸.

No public evidence identified of Shell shipping, freight-forwarding or port-handling contracts for Israeli defence logistics ⁸.

Taranto crude shipments: Eni statement on a Shell-handled cargo (May 2026). Greenpeace Italia says that between June 2024 and November 2025 at least 17 shipments left Italian ports for Israel, about 300,000 tonnes of refined products and about 100,000 tonnes of crude, and that in 8 of the 9 cases with an identifiable buyer the fuel went to the Bazan and Paz groups, which it says hold supply contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence or air force ^{7, 9}.

• Acting entity: Shell, with the exact legal entity not established; Eni said one of three Taranto shipments was “curata da Shell” (handled by Shell), and the crude came from the Tempa Rossa oil centre in which Shell E&P Italia S.p.A. holds 25% ^{7, 11}.
• Recipient or beneficiary: not named for the Shell-handled cargo; two of the three Taranto shipments were destined for the Paz group, and the buyer of the third is not named in any retrieved page ^{7, 11}.
• Buyer-contract status: Greenpeace Italia attributes Ministry of Defence or air force supply contracts to Paz and Bazan; the release gives no contract dates or values, and the retrieved pages do not say whether the Shell-handled buyer is one of them ⁷.
• Channel: the Greenpeace Italia website (greenpeace.org) and the Rai 3 programme Report, with reprints on giornalemio.it and notiziegeopolitiche.net ^{7, 9, 10, 11}.
• Earliest and latest dated observations: the shipments fall between June 2024 and November 2025 with no individual date for the Shell-handled cargo, and the publications are dated 10 May 2026 (Giornale Mio), 11 May 2026 (Notizie Geopolitiche) and 12 May 2026 and later ^{7, 10, 11}.
• Eni’s position: it “ha agito solo da terminalista” (acted only as terminal operator), and Volere la Luna’s reproduction of the findings says Eni denies any commercial role and attributes it to the Tempa Rossa joint venture while admitting only a logistics role ^{7, 31}.
• Shell’s position: “Shell non ha replicato” (Shell did not reply), and TotalEnergies said it was not involved in the cited shipments ^{7, 10}.
• Joint-venture shares: a 2012 trade page gives Total 75% (operator) and Shell 25% in Tempa Rossa [pre-2020], which differs from Greenpeace’s Total 50%, Shell 25%, Mitsui 25% by the Mitsui share, and the 2012 page does not mention Mitsui ^{7, 13}.
• Status: unknown at the research date, because the cargo’s date is not given and no later Shell statement or exit was found ^{7, 32}.

Seasalvia, Taranto (24 September to 30 October 2025). L’Indipendente (26 September 2025) reports that the tanker Seasalvia, owned by Thenamaris and chartered by Shell, was due to load about 30,000 tonnes of crude at Taranto that unions said was for Israeli military aviation, and that Eni cancelled the berthing authorisation after a union protest on 24 September 2025 ¹⁴.

• Acting entity: the charterer is stated as “Shell” with no legal entity, and this is stated by one retrieved source only; ANSA, Il Foglio, MeteoWeb, Espansione TV and both PortsEurope articles do not mention a Shell charter ^{14, 33, 34, 35, 36, 32, 37}.
• Cargo origin and recipient: l’Indipendente’s search-indexed account links the crude to Tempa Rossa and the Eni loading, while Il Foglio (30 September 2025) places the loading at the Eni Taranto refinery and describes the cargo as intended for the Israeli air force, and no buyer is named in any retrieved page ^{14, 34}.
• Destination: the sources disagree, with the harbour authority said to cite Ashkelon, MeteoWeb giving Egypt as the official destination with the union claiming Israeli military aviation, and Il Foglio saying the ship then headed for Greece ^{14, 34, 35}.
• Dates: protest and berth cancellation on 24 September 2025, loading authorised on 26 September, departure on 28 September 2025, and refinery-gate blockade from 29 September 2025 ^{14, 34, 35, 37}.
• Second call: PortsEurope (30 October 2025) reports a USB union protest outside the Taranto Prefecture against the expected arrival of the Seasalvia that evening; the text retrieved does not state a charterer, Shell or a destination, and whether a second loading took place is not established ³⁷.
• Eni’s position: MeteoWeb reports that Eni, at a prefecture meeting, reportedly said it was contractually obliged to carry out the loading ³⁵.
• Link to the Report cargoes: no retrieved page ties the Seasalvia to the three Taranto shipments in the Greenpeace investigation, although the loading falls within the June 2024 to November 2025 window ^{7, 14}.
• Status: the first loading ended with the ship’s departure on 28 September 2025, while the outcome of the expected 30 October 2025 call and any later Shell-linked loadings at Taranto are unknown ^{35, 37}.

A report by the Palestinian Initiative for Climate Strategy and Disrupt Power (8 November 2025) also describes the blocked Seasalvia loading and Eni revoking its docking authorisation, and in the portion read it does not discuss Shell’s role at Taranto ³⁸.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal systems, munitions, strategic platforms, critical sub-systems. No public evidence identified of any Shell role as prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, munitions or precursor supplier, or component supplier for missile defence, fighter aircraft, tanks or warships in the pages retrieved ^{5, 30, 29}.

AI and software targeting systems. No public evidence identified of any Shell product that generates targeting decisions or weapons effects ⁵.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export licence decisions. No public evidence identified of any government decision to grant, deny, suspend or revoke an export licence for Shell products to Israeli military or security end-users ^{5, 6}.

Arms embargo and sanctions compliance. No public evidence identified of any investigation, citation or enforcement action against Shell concerning arms-embargo or export-control compliance related to Israel ^{5, 6}.

Legal challenges. No public evidence identified of court proceedings or judicial review naming Shell over a defence supply relationship with Israel; the BHRRC entry shows only that it asked Shell how any oil supply fits with the International Court of Justice ruling and the UN Guiding Principles, and Shell declined to comment ⁶.

At Taranto, the only regulatory act found was Eni’s cancellation of a berthing authorisation on 24 September 2025 after union protests, reported by the harbourmaster to protesters, and the vessel later loaded; this is not an export-licence or judicial decision ^{14, 35}.

Constructive notice. The OCI shipping data underlying the earlier NGO findings covers October 2023 to July 2024, which ends just after the ICJ advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, and OCI’s November 2025 update tracks fuel deliveries from November 2023 to October 2025 on a page that does not mention Shell ^{5, 39}.

OCI’s news page of 3 September 2026 covers October 2023 to June 2026 and names the traders Vitol and Heritage Petroleum FZCO, and the page read does not mention Shell ⁴⁰.

The Greenpeace window (June 2024 to November 2025) and the Seasalvia calls (September and October 2025) both extend past the ICJ advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 and the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants, but the date of the Shell-handled cargo is not given and the Shell charter of the Seasalvia rests on one source, so whether a specific Shell-attributed cargo post-dates either event is not established ^{7, 14, 37}.

SOMO’s “Powering Injustice” (BHRRC entry dated 17 December 2024) puts companies on notice after the July 2024 ICJ opinion and the November 2024 ICC warrants, and the page does not name Shell ⁴¹.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Greenpeace Italia and Rai 3 “Report” (broadcast and release 10 to 12 May 2026). The investigation, produced by Greenpeace Italia’s investigative unit with the Rai 3 programme Report using Kpler data and independent research, is the first retrieved report to place a Shell-handled crude cargo in the Israel-bound chain ^{7, 9, 11}.

• Acting entity: Shell (legal entity unspecified), per an Eni statement, with Shell E&P Italia S.p.A. holding 25% of Tempa Rossa ^{7, 11}.
• Allegation scope: Greenpeace says the fuel went to companies linked to the Israeli armed forces; these are the campaigner’s and programme’s allegations and not a court or regulator finding ^{7, 9}.
• Shell’s response: Shell did not reply to Report, and no Shell statement on the Greenpeace findings was found in the retrieved sources ^{7, 10}.
• Quoted legal framing: UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese is quoted as saying “Commerciare petrolio con Israele è illegale” (trading oil with Israel is illegal) ⁷.
• Persistence and audience: the Greenpeace pages and reprints were still online at the research date, and the programme audience figure is not stated in the retrieved pages ^{7, 9, 11}.

Oil Change International, “Behind the Barrel” (landing entry of 14 March 2024; company shares in the release of 20 August 2024). OCI’s landing entry says the crude supply “implicates major international oil companies including BP, Chevron, ENI, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies” and gives no company percentages ⁴².

• Company shares: OCI’s publication page and release state that companies collectively supply 66% of oil to Israel and that six majors, listed as Chevron 8%, BP 8%, ExxonMobil 6%, Shell 5%, Eni 4% and TotalEnergies 5%, are “responsible for over half of that (35%)” ^{12, 43}.
• Reading of the figures: 35% is the combined share of the six majors, not a Shell-specific figure, and Shell’s own listed share is 5%; the six listed shares add to 36, which suggests rounding ^{12, 43}.
• Period: the company-share passage states no period, the only dated range on the page being 65 shipments from 21 October 2023 to 12 July 2024, and AFSC dates its 5% estimate to crude Israel imported from October 2023 to July 2024 ^{5, 12, 43}.
• Acting entity: Shell plc, as named; the producing subsidiary is not identified in the retrieved text ^{42, 6}.
• Recipient or beneficiary: Israel’s crude imports in general, not the Ministry of Defence specifically ^{5, 42}.
• Channel: oilchange.org, then the BHRRC entry ^{42, 6}.
• Dates: OCI briefing 14 March 2024; OCI company-share release 20 August 2024; BHRRC entry 10 September 2024; AFSC profile valid as of 10 September 2025 ^{5, 42, 6, 43}.
• Status: unknown; the OCI November 2025 update page, which tracks deliveries to October 2025, does not name Shell, and the 3 September 2026 news page does not either ^{39, 40}.

Specific allegations. The BHRRC Shell entry (10 September 2024) says Shell is linked to 35% of crude supplied to Israel since October 2023, that Kazakh crude flows through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which Shell partly owns, and that a 30-kiloton shipment from the Val d’Agri project, where Shell holds 39%, was imported by Israel ⁶. Against OCI’s own text, the 35% in that entry matches the six majors’ combined share and not a Shell-only share ^{12, 43}.

AFSC’s profile says OCI estimates Shell-produced oil at about 5% of Israel’s crude imports, produced in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Italy, which matches Shell’s 5% in OCI’s company breakdown; the earlier apparent discrepancy between 35% and 5% is therefore resolved as a combined-versus-individual difference ^{5, 12}.

BHRRC entries. The BHRRC fuel-supply page (10 September 2024) lists Shell as invited to respond and not responding ⁴⁴.

• Quoted caveat in the report: companies “could be held liable for complicity in acts of genocide” in light of recent ICJ rulings ⁴⁴.
• The BHRRC Shell entry records that Shell declined to comment on the allegations, and no Shell-specific update after September 2024 appears on it ⁶.

SOMO. The jet-fuel briefing body does not name Shell, and “Powering Injustice” does not name Shell in the BHRRC summary ^{41, 8}.

UN and OHCHR material. The UN Special Rapporteur’s report A/HRC/59/23 “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide” is catalogued on UNISPAL, and the coverage reviewed names Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Palantir, Caterpillar and Booking.com (Reason), Elbit, IAI, Maersk and Fanuc (Al Jazeera), and Chevron, BP, Drummond and Glencore in the energy and coal sectors (AOAV), without naming Shell ^{45, 30, 29, 46}.

The OpenSanctions page for the OHCHR settlement-business database describes 212 entities and lists no names on the retrieved page, and the HRVoices entry gives only the 30 June 2023 update date ^{47, 48}.

The UN Geneva newsroom note on the update presented to the Human Rights Council on 29 September 2025 (covering 2 August 2019 to 30 April 2025) says 215 enterprises were assessed and reasonable grounds were found for 158, seven enterprises from the 2023 update were removed, and the note names no company, so no public evidence identified that Shell is listed in the material read ⁴⁹.

Boycott and divestment. None of the retrieved pages describes a boycott, divestment or exclusion campaign against Shell over defence-sector activity; no public evidence identified ^{5, 6}.

Corporate response. Shell declined to comment and logged non-responses on 10 September 2024, did not reply to Report in 2026, and no policy statement, contract termination or end-use monitoring commitment on Israel was found in the retrieved sources; no public evidence identified ^{44, 6, 7}.