INDEX / DIRECTORY / SHELL ENERGY / POLITICAL

Shell Energy POLITICAL

POLITICAL AUDIT UPDATED 2026-11-03
Political Score 2.60 /10 D Shell Energy - Complicity Index 283
Political 2.60

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This audit treats “Shell Energy” as a brand used across the Shell plc group, because the group’s subsidiary list names many Shell Energy entities, none of them in Israel in the portion read 1. Evidence is organised by the requested categories. Items dated before 2020 are flagged [pre-2020]. No scores or conclusions are given.

Corporate Communications & Public Stance

Statements. On 28 February 2022 Shell announced it would end its equity partnerships with Gazprom entities, including the Salym joint venture and Nord Stream 2, and agreed to sell its 27.5% interest in Sakhalin-II; CEO Ben van Beurden was quoted as saying “We are shocked by the loss of life in Ukraine, which we deplore” 2, 3.

Statements on Israel/Palestine. For the Gaza Marine field, a Shell spokesman said in March 2018 that “We confirm we have been in discussions with various parties about the future of the Gaza Marine project” and “As of now, Shell continues to hold its equity in the Gaza Marine asset” 4, 5 [pre-2020]. Natural Gas World reported on 7 March 2018 that Shell said it had not yet sold its interest and was seeking a buyer 6 [pre-2020]. On 4 April 2018 Shell announced the divestment of its Gaza Marine interest to the Palestine Investment Fund, and Offshore Energy quoted Shell as saying “This deal is consistent with Shell’s strategy to high-grade and simplify our portfolio” 7 [pre-2020]. WAFA reported the same day that “Shell’s divestment is related to its corporate strategy and global portfolio management priorities” 8 [pre-2020].

Statements on supply allegations. On 10 September 2024 the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre reported that it had asked Shell whether it supplies oil to Israel and how that fits with the ICJ ruling and the UN Guiding Principles, and that Shell “declined to comment on the allegations” 9. Greenpeace Italia reported that Shell did not respond to Rai 3 Report’s request for comment on Italian crude shipments to Israel, with a broadcast date of 10 May 2026 10.

Comparative silence. Beyond the 2018 Gaza Marine remarks and the 2024 and 2026 non-responses above, no public evidence identified of any general Shell corporate statement on the Israel-Palestine conflict in the pages retrieved, and a further search for a Shell statement on Israel, Palestine or Gaza in 2025 and 2026 returned only the 2018 divestment coverage and the non-response item 9, 10, 7.

Market framing. In 2013 Algemeiner/JNS reported, citing an analyst, that Shell “fears that direct or indirect investment in Israel could strain its relations with Arab nations” 11 [pre-2020]. A Shell spokesperson told the JC on 9 April 2013 that Shell had “already divested a substantial stake in Woodside before the Leviathan announcement” 12 [pre-2020]. No public evidence identified of Shell annual-report or PR language describing its Israel-region operations; Shell’s own annual report pages could not be retrieved 1.

Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories

Gaza Marine (offshore Gaza), licence history. The Palestinian Authority granted a 25-year exploration licence with 90 percent equity to British Gas (BG) in 1999; BG drilled two wells finding reserves estimated at 1.4 tcf, per Al-Haq (publication dated 20 January 2015) 13 [pre-2020]. Globes reported on 13 March 2013 that BG “owns 60% of the rights,” with CCC owning 30% and the Palestinian Investment Fund 10% 14 [pre-2020]. Shell acquired BG on 8 April 2016 15 [pre-2020].

Gaza Marine, size of Shell’s stake (sources conflict). Al Jazeera reported on 6 March 2018 that Shell held 55%, had struggled to find a buyer, and that the Palestinian cabinet said Shell was pulling out 5 [pre-2020]. Globes (8 March 2018) gave Shell’s stake as 60% against 40% for the Palestinian side 4 [pre-2020]. Middle East Eye (5 April 2018) said Shell acquired a 55 percent stake through the BG takeover 16 [pre-2020]. Natural Gas World and Offshore Energy, reporting Shell’s 4 April 2018 announcement, said Shell sold its “entire 90% interest and operatorship” and that its interest was 90 percent 17, 7 [pre-2020]. No retrieved primary document (Shell release, licence text or PIF statement) reconciles the 55%, 60% and 90% figures, so the size of Shell’s stake is unresolved 17, 7, 16.

Gaza Marine, entity and buyer. Offshore Energy reported that the seller was BG Great Britain Limited and the buyer the Palestine Investment Fund 7 [pre-2020]. WAFA described BG Great Britain Limited as an affiliate of Royal Dutch Shell PLC and described PIF as the Palestinian Authority’s investment arm 8 [pre-2020]. Middle East Eye reported that under the new structure PIF and its partner CC Oil and Gas Ltd would each hold 27.5 percent of development rights and a foreign operator the remaining 45 percent 16 [pre-2020]. No retrieved source states whether CC Oil and Gas Ltd is the same entity as Consolidated Contractors Company 16, 8.

Gaza Marine status. Wikipedia, citing Globes of 3 August 2018, says Shell relinquished its stake to Palestinian state companies, and that a 2023 arrangement among Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority lists the Palestine Investment Fund and Consolidated Contractors Company at 27.5% each and an Egyptian EGAS consortium at 45% 15. The April 2018 reports name PIF as the buyer, and the divestment was reported on 4 April 2018 17, 7, 8. The field has not produced gas; Shell’s own release or filing on the exit was not retrieved 15.

Settlements and occupied-territory operations. No public evidence identified of Shell equipment sales, service contracts, dealerships or subsidiary activity inside Israeli settlements; the Shell group’s 2023 significant-subsidiary exhibit lists, in the portion read, only one Israeli entity, Ravin AI Ltd (Ramat Gan, 36% owned), and no Shell Energy entity in Israel 1.

Israeli gas exposure. In April 2013 reports said Shell might sell its Woodside stake after Woodside took a 30% interest in Israel’s Leviathan field; the JC stated Shell still owned 23% of Woodside and Shell said it had sold just under 30 per cent of its total interest in Woodside in 2010 12, 11 [pre-2020]. On 21 August 2017 The New Arab, citing media reports, said Shell was considering buying gas from Leviathan for its Egyptian LNG plants, about 5 bcm per year, with no Shell comment in the article; whether any contract was signed is unknown from retrieved sources 18 [pre-2020].

Oil and fuel supply to Israel (NGO allegations). The Oil Change International “Behind the Barrel” briefing of August 2024 states that investor-owned and private oil companies “collectively supply 66% of oil to Israel” and that six major international oil companies “(including Chevron (8%), BP (8%) ExxonMobil (6%), Shell (5%)” are “responsible for over half of that (35%)” 19. The 35% is therefore a combined figure for the six companies, and the briefing’s figure for Shell on its own is 5%; the retrieved text gives no time window for these percentages and no Shell shipment detail 19. The AFSC Investigate profile of Shell PLC (dated 10 September 2025) attributes to Oil Change International an estimate that Shell-produced oil made up about 5% of Israel’s total crude imports from October 2023 to July 2024, produced in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Italy 20. BHRRC (10 September 2024), citing Oil Change International, wrote that major international oil companies such as Shell are linked to 35% of the crude supplied to Israel since October 2023, so that 35% is the combined figure and not a Shell-only share; it also cited Shell’s partial ownership of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (Kazakhstan 22% of Israel’s imports) and a 30-kiloton Val d’Agri shipment, 1% of the total, where Shell holds 39% 9. The OCI “Behind the Barrel” hub lists a 14 March 2024 briefing that names BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalEnergies as implicated, an August 2024 briefing tracking 65 shipments of which 35 (54%) left origin after the 26 January 2024 ICJ ruling, and a November 2025 update 21. The OCI March 2024 briefing page names no company and refers readers to a data PDF 22. The November 2025 OCI release covers 323 shipments totalling 21.2 million tonnes to Israel from November 2023 to October 2025 and names suppliers by country, not by company 23. These percentages are Oil Change International’s attribution by corporate ownership interest; they do not themselves show that Shell sold or shipped the oil 19, 20.

Italian cargoes. Greenpeace Italia with Rai 3 Report identified at least 17 fuel shipments from Italian ports to Israel between June 2024 and November 2025; three left the Taranto terminal with crude from Tempa Rossa, owned by TotalEnergies EP Italia (50%), Shell E&P Italia (25%) and Mitsui E&P Italia (25%), and Eni said Shell handled one of the three 10. Shell did not respond to the request for comment 10. These are advocacy and broadcast findings; Shell’s role as seller or shipper beyond the one cargo Eni attributed to it is not established in the retrieved sources 10. AFSC states Bazan, Delek, Paz and Sonol are major fuel suppliers to the Israeli military and that Delek, Paz and Sonol operate stations including in settlements, but it does not say Shell supplies them directly 20.

Constructive-notice timing. The cargo and supply reports above cover periods after the 26 January 2024 ICJ ruling and after 19 July 2024 (the Greenpeace window runs to November 2025), and BHRRC’s request for comment is dated 10 September 2024 9, 21, 10. Whether Shell’s conduct continued, ended or changed is unknown, because Shell gave no response and the November 2025 OCI update names no companies 9, 23.

UN and legal scrutiny. The OHCHR 2023 database update reviewed the 112 enterprises in the 2020 database and found grounds to remove 15; the summary page names no companies 24. Retrieved coverage of A/HRC/59/23 (3 July 2025) names Lockheed Martin, Palantir and Volvo and no oil company 25. Al Jazeera’s coverage of 3 July 2025 names companies including Lockheed Martin, Leonardo, Elbit, Caterpillar, Maersk, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Booking and Airbnb, and says letters went to 48 companies without listing them all; Middle East Eye’s coverage names no oil, gas or energy company either 26, 27. No retrieved source places Shell or BG Group in the OHCHR database or in A/HRC/59/23, but the coverage is not exhaustive and the primary documents could not be text-searched, so this is unresolved 25, 24, 26, 27. No public evidence identified of court cases, regulatory actions or OECD complaints against Shell concerning Israel-Palestine in retrieved sources 20.

Civil society and boycott history. AFSC Investigate publishes a Shell PLC divestment-research profile linking Shell to oil supply to Israel 20. No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment or sanctions campaign specifically targeting Shell on Israel-Palestine grounds, or of a documented Shell response beyond the declinations above 9, 20.

Internal Governance, Content & Retail Policies

Employee relations. No public evidence identified of reports, controversies or legal actions on Shell HR enforcement concerning employee speech, political symbols or union activity related to the region.

Platform and editorial policy. No public evidence identified; Shell operates no content platform 28.

Retail and supply chain. No public evidence identified of reports or regulatory action on labelling, sourcing or categorisation of settlement-origin products by Shell Energy. Shell Energy Retail Limited (UK) was owned by Shell from 28 February 2018 and has been owned by Octopus Energy since December 2023 28.

Brand Heritage & State Partnerships

Marketing positioning. No public evidence identified of Shell Energy using military heritage, defence ties or state-security origins in branding.

Institutional ties and sponsorships. On 21 May 2019, Globes reported that Shell Ventures joined a $4 million seed round for Haifa-based Ravin.ai, led by Pico Venture Partners, calling it Shell Ventures’ first investment in an Israeli startup 29 [pre-2020]. The Shell group’s 2023 subsidiary exhibit lists Ravin AI Ltd (Ramat Gan) as 36% owned, so the relationship was continuing as of 31 December 2023; later status is unknown 1. H2Pro, a Technion-founded Israeli company, won Shell’s New Energy Challenge, reported by the Jerusalem Post on 2 January 2021 (updated 30 October 2022), and the article states no prize sum 30. These are commercial and innovation relationships; no public evidence identified of state honours, hosting of Israeli government officials, state-institution partnerships or “Brand Israel” sponsorships.

Lobbying, Advocacy, Financing & Logistics

Political lobbying. Shell’s EU Transparency Register data, via LobbyFacts, shows declared annual lobbying spend between €3.875m (2011) and €5.5m (2022), €4.5m for both 2024 and 2025, with 18 lobbyists (13 FTE) 31. Commission meeting subjects listed include “Current Middle East crisis” (30 March 2026) and “the implications of the announced peace deal in the Middle East on energy markets” (19 June 2026) 31. In the portion read, the page does not mention Israel, and it records energy-market, not Israel-Palestine policy, topics 31. US LDA, FEC and UK register data could not be checked 31.

Financial contributions. No public evidence identified of Shell donations to settlement groups, FIDF, JNF/KKL, IDF welfare bodies or other parastatal organisations.

Crisis asset mobilisation. No public evidence identified of Shell directing logistics, free services or infrastructure to Israeli state, military or state-aligned NGO efforts. The Ukraine comparison is a corporate statement and exit, not documented asset mobilisation, in the retrieved sources 2, 3.

Settlement Nexus and Military-Donation items. No public evidence identified of Shell sponsoring settlement events or donating to settlement entities or military-welfare funds.

Corporate Structure & Primary Mission

Ownership. Shell plc’s largest holders per a Tikr page (updated 8 September 2025) are Vanguard Group (3.20%), BlackRock Institutional Trust (3.07%) and Norges Bank (2.57%); the page shows no holder at 10% or more and no state holder 32. No public evidence identified of golden shares or a state-advancing mission in Shell’s charter.

Group entities. The Shell group’s 2023 Exhibit 8.1 (as of 31 December 2023) lists Shell Energy entities including Shell Energy Australia Pty Ltd, Shell Energy Europe B.V., Shell Energy Retail B.V., Shell Energy Deutschland GmbH, Shell Energy Italia S.R.L. and Shell Energy North America (Canada) Inc. 1. The Shell Energy Retail Limited (UK) history is in 28. BG Great Britain Limited is described by WAFA as a Shell affiliate and was the seller named in the 2018 Gaza Marine divestment 7, 8.

Named-entity record.

Act record.

Executive & Leadership Footprint

Personal philanthropy and financing. No public evidence identified of donations or foundation grants by Shell’s CEO, Chair or directors to FIDF, JNF, IDF-linked bodies, settlement groups or regional advocacy organisations; a name-based search on CEO Wael Sawan and Chair Sir Andrew Mackenzie returned nothing 33.

Public advocacy and statements. No public evidence identified of public statements, op-eds or social-media activity by Shell’s CEO or Chair on the Israel-Palestine conflict in the pages retrieved 33.

Board memberships and affiliations. A Global Witness article (14 June 2023) lists Wael Sawan (CEO), Sir Andrew Mackenzie (Chair), Catherine Hughes, Sir Charles Roxburgh, Abraham Schot, Neil Carson and Cyrus Taraporevala, with no defence-industry or Israel ties mentioned 33. It is an advocacy publication, and the board has changed since 33. Shell’s own board page could not be retrieved.

Named-entity record.

Footnotes

  1. Shell plc, Exhibit 8.1 Significant Subsidiaries and Other Related Undertakings, as of 31 December 2023 (SEC). https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1306965/000130696524000026/a2023exhibits-81.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  2. NS Energy, “Shell to exit JVs with Gazprom in Russia” (page dated 1 March 2022; source for the Gazprom entities and the van Beurden quote). https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/news/shell-exit-gazprom-jvs-russia/ ↩ ↩2

  3. ClickOnDetroit (AP), “Shell pulls out of energy investments in Russia over war,” 28 February 2022 (source for the announcement date, the Sakhalin-II 27.5% stake, Salym and Nord Stream 2; the van Beurden quote in this article differs from the one cited above). https://www.clickondetroit.com/business/2022/02/28/shell-pulls-out-of-energy-investments-in-russia-over-war/ ↩ ↩2

  4. Globes, “Shell relinquishes Gaza gas field rights,” 8 March 2018. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-shell-relinquishes-gaza-gas-field-rights-1001226973 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. Al Jazeera, “PA: Shell pulls out of Gaza’s gas field,” 6 March 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/economy/2018/3/6/pa-shell-pulls-out-of-gazas-gas-field ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. Natural Gas World, “Shell Eyes Exit from Gaza,” 7 March 2018. https://naturalgasworld.com/shell-still-holds-gaza-strip-offshore-field-59467 ↩

  7. Offshore Energy, “Shell divests offshore block in Palestine,” 4 April 2018. https://offshore-energy.biz/2018/04/04/shell-divests-offshore-block-in-palestine ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  8. WAFA (Palestine News and Info Agency), report on Shell’s divestment of Gaza Marine to PIF, 4 April 2018. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/93475 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  9. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Shell response item, 10 September 2024. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/shell-non/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  10. Greenpeace Italia press release on Italian fuel shipments to Israel (Rai 3 Report). https://www.greenpeace.org/italy/comunicato-stampa/30845/gaza-litalia-ha-inviato-petrolio-e-carburante-ad-aziende-collegate-alle-forze-armate-israeliane-responsabili-del-genocidio/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  11. Algemeiner/JNS, Shell and Woodside Leviathan report, 4 April 2013. https://www.algemeiner.com/?p=104819 ↩ ↩2

  12. The Jewish Chronicle, “Shell reacts to claims over Israel gas field,” 9 April 2013. https://thejc.com/news/shell-reacts-to-claims-over-israel-gas-field-ypghqj0a ↩ ↩2

  13. Al-Haq publication on Gaza Marine, 20 January 2015. https://alhaq.org/publications/8071.html ↩ ↩2

  14. Globes, “Israel in secret talks with BG on Palestinian gas,” 13 March 2013. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000829662 ↩

  15. Wikipedia, “Natural gas in the Gaza Strip” (secondary). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_gas_in_the_Gaza_Strip ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. Middle East Eye, “Palestinians to sell majority stake in Gaza field yet to produce gas,” 5 April 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestinians-sell-majority-stake-gaza-field-yet-produce-gas ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  17. Natural Gas World, report on Shell’s Gaza Marine divestment to the Palestine Investment Fund (Shell announcement of 4 April 2018). https://www.naturalgasworld.com/shell-divests-gaza-interest-60112 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  18. The New Arab, “Shell ‘to buy Israeli gas’ for Egypt market,” 21 August 2017. https://www.newarab.com/news/shell-buy-israeli-gas-egypt-market ↩

  19. Oil Change International, “Behind the Barrel: new insights into the countries and companies behind Israel’s fuel supply,” August 2024. https://oilchange.org/publications/behind-the-barrel-new-insights-into-the-countries-and-companies-behind-israels-fuel-supply/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  20. AFSC Investigate, Shell PLC profile, 10 September 2025. https://investigate.afsc.org/node/8303 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  21. Oil Change International, “Behind the Barrel” hub. https://oilchange.org/behind-the-barrel/ ↩ ↩2

  22. Oil Change International, “Investigating the countries and companies behind Israeli crude oil and fuel supply chains,” March 2024. https://oilchange.org/publications/investigating-the-countries-and-companies-behind-israeli-crude-oil-and-fuel-supply-chains/ ↩

  23. Oil Change International, Behind the Barrel update, 13 November 2025. https://oilchange.org/news/countries-fueling-gaza-genocide/ ↩ ↩2

  24. Palestine-Australia, summary of the 2023 OHCHR database update. https://www.palestine-australia.com/highlights/news/2023/ohchr-update-of-database-of-business-enterprises-in-relation-to-occupied-palestinian-territory/ ↩ ↩2

  25. Gulf News, report on the Albanese A/HRC/59/23 report, 3 July 2025. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/un-report-accuses-global-corporations-of-profiting-from-gaza-genocide-urges-sanctions-on-israel-1.500186009 ↩ ↩2

  26. Al Jazeera, “UN expert calls on world to end trade with Israel’s economy of genocide,” 3 July 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/7/3/un-expert-calls-on-world-to-end-trade-with-israels-economy-of-genocide ↩ ↩2

  27. Middle East Eye, report on the UN Special Rapporteur’s economy-of-genocide report (2025; date not shown in retrieved text). https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-israel-corporations-economy-genocide-report-reveals ↩ ↩2

  28. Wikipedia, “Shell Energy” (secondary). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_Energy ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  29. Globes, “Shell makes first investment in Israeli startup,” 21 May 2019. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-shell-makes-first-investment-in-israeli-startup-1001286534 ↩

  30. Jerusalem Post, “Israeli startup H2Pro wins Shell’s energy competition,” 2 January 2021. https://jpost.com/israel-news/israeli-startup-h2pro-wins-shells-energy-competition-654018 ↩

  31. LobbyFacts.eu, Shell Companies EU Transparency Register data. http://www.lobbyfacts.eu/representative/5c3fbbd9f4ec4a5684955ce51301502f/shell-companies ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  32. Tikr, “Who Owns Shell? Biggest Shareholders and Insider Moves,” updated 8 September 2025. https://www.tikr.com/blog/who-owns-shell-biggest-shareholders-and-insider-moves ↩ ↩2

  33. Global Witness, “Meet Shell’s board of directors,” 14 June 2023. https://globalwitness.org/en/blog/meet-shells-board-directors-record-profits-and-huge-shareholder-payouts ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7