Eventbrite DIGITAL

Target: Eventbrite, Inc. Research date: 22 October 2026 Evidence period: 2023–2026, with historical corporate information where relevant. Domain: Digital - Digital Forensics

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Corporate structure and attribution

On 10 March 2026, Eventbrite completed its acquisition by Bending Spoons through a transaction involving Bending Spoons US Inc. and Everest Merger Sub Inc. Eventbrite became a wholly owned subsidiary of the Bending Spoons group. Its outstanding shares were converted into the right to receive $4.50 per share.^{1, 2}

Eventbrite’s 2025 Form 10-K identifies 10 March 2026 as the completion date and records the resignation of its pre-acquisition directors. Most executive officers also resigned in connection with the transaction.¹

UK Companies House separately records that Bending Spoons S.p.A. became a person with significant control of Eventbrite UK Limited on 1 July 2026. The relevant notification was filed on 30 July 2026.³

The December 2025 investor documentation described Bending Spoons as an Italian technology company acquiring and operating digital businesses. Its portfolio included Brightcove, Evernote, komoot, Meetup, Remini, WeTransfer and Vimeo. This establishes the acquisition’s group context; Eventbrite’s subsequent corporate-control position is documented by the March 2026 completion filings.^{4, 5}

Identified enterprise software vendors

Eventbrite publishes a register identifying companies that process personal information in connection with its services. The register categorises suppliers according to the functions they provide.⁶

The disclosed business-infrastructure providers include Amazon Web Services, Atlassian, Splunk, IBM, Google Workspace, Salesforce, Spanning Cloud Apps/Kaseya and Snowflake.⁶

The identified analytics providers include Google Analytics, StarTree and LexisNexis Risk Solutions.⁶

The identified payment providers include Cybersource, Adyen, Braintree, MercadoLibre and Stripe.⁶

Communications providers include Tray.io, MessageBird/SparkPost and Slack.⁶

The register identifies Concentrix and Teleperformance under outsourced services and Bending Spoons and its affiliates under group services.⁶

Evidence date: The register displays an update date of 2 March 2023, although the Bending Spoons entry reflects the later corporate relationship. The precise effective date and current contractual scope of each listed supplier cannot be determined from the displayed date alone.⁶

Israeli-origin software

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite has directly licensed, purchased or deployed Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Palo Alto Networks or comparable Israeli-origin enterprise-security products. The reviewed public subprocessor inventory does not identify those suppliers.⁶

No public evidence identified establishing that an Israeli-origin cybersecurity product is supplied to Eventbrite indirectly through a bundled service or managed-security arrangement. The published register is a list of disclosed subprocessors rather than an exhaustive software inventory.⁶

No public evidence identified establishing that Bending Spoons or a disclosed group affiliate provides Eventbrite with Israeli-origin cybersecurity, surveillance or analytics technology. The existing acquisition disclosures establish group ownership but do not identify such a deployment within Eventbrite.^{4, 5, 6}

No public evidence identified establishing a direct Eventbrite software-licensing relationship with the named Israeli-origin suppliers. Their absence from the published subprocessor register does not independently disconfirm their possible use as internal enterprise software.⁶

Technology dependency

Eventbrite’s 2025 Form 10-K describes the development of scalable technology infrastructure and a transition from a monolithic architecture toward microservices. The company also reported investment in platform reliability, machine-learning-assisted discovery, fraud prevention and AI-supported event creation.⁷

AWS appears in Eventbrite’s business-infrastructure subprocessor category, while several payment processors are separately identified as payment-service providers. The public register does not allocate exact infrastructure workloads, processing volumes, expenditure or dependency percentages among the companies.⁶

No public evidence identified quantifying Eventbrite’s infrastructure expenditure associated with Israeli-origin technology providers or the percentage of critical infrastructure dependent upon such providers.^{6, 7}

Systems integration and outsourcing

Concentrix and Teleperformance are identified as outsourced service providers in Eventbrite’s published subprocessor register.⁶

No public evidence identified of an Eventbrite systems-integrator engagement that mandated or deployed Israeli-origin enterprise technology. The disclosed vendor inventory does not identify such an engagement.⁶

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin security software introduced through a documented Eventbrite digital-transformation project. The company’s SEC technology disclosure does not establish such a deployment.⁷

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial recognition and biometrics

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite deploying facial-recognition, gait-analysis or biometric-identification products from Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax or comparable Israeli-origin vendors. Eventbrite’s public account-security documentation describes multifactor authentication through authenticator applications, without identifying a biometric-identification supplier.⁸

Behavioural analytics

Eventbrite provides event organizers with analytics relating to registrations, attendee numbers, orders, ticket sales and geographic distributions of attendees.⁹

Its published documentation supports integration with Google Analytics, including measurement of event-listing visits, registration activity and completed purchases. The documentation records an available integration and does not establish that every organizer activates it.¹⁰

Eventbrite’s Meta Pixel integration permits organizers to track page views, registrations and purchase-related activity. Its documentation also describes optional server-side tracking through Meta’s Conversions API.¹¹

Additional documented integrations include TikTok tracking pixels and X conversion-tracking pixels.^{12, 13}

These features establish behavioural and transaction analytics capabilities. Their activation and configuration can vary by organizer, and the cited integration documentation does not establish procurement of Israeli-origin surveillance technology.^{10, 11, 12, 13}

Predictive monitoring

Eventbrite’s 2025 Form 10-K describes investment in fraud-detection models and machine learning for event search and discovery.⁷

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite using Israeli-origin predictive-policing, workforce-surveillance, intelligence-monitoring or sentiment-analysis systems. The identified public analytics documentation concerns commercial event-management and marketing functionality.^{7, 9}

Third-party deployment

The published tracking-pixel documentation confirms that event organizers can configure third-party marketing integrations. Meta integration can include server-side transmission when specifically configured.¹¹

These integrations establish technical routes through which event and transaction information may reach configured third-party analytics services, subject to implementation and applicable privacy settings.^{10, 11, 12, 13}

No public evidence identified that Israeli-origin surveillance products are deployed indirectly through those integrations.^{10, 11, 12, 13}

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite’s publicly documented marketing integrations specifically transmit attendee data to an Israeli-domiciled surveillance provider or Israeli government system.^{10, 11, 12, 13}

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Data-processing activities

Eventbrite’s organizer Data Processing Addendum was updated on 20 August 2026. It describes processing undertaken on behalf of organizers in connection with event registration, ticketing, payments and event-management services.¹⁴

The DPA identifies personal-data categories including names, email addresses, billing details, payment information, events booked and attended, relationships with organizers and additional personal information requested by organizers.¹⁴

The DPA distinguishes processing undertaken by Eventbrite on behalf of organizers from circumstances in which Eventbrite acts independently as a controller, including certain research, product-improvement and recommendation activities.¹⁴

Eventbrite’s privacy policy, updated 15 September 2026, describes a broader service ecosystem encompassing websites, mobile applications, APIs, marketing and other event-management services.¹⁵

The organizer DPA permits personal-data processing through authorised subprocessors and international transfers subject to applicable legal and contractual requirements.¹⁴

Eventbrite’s vendor DPA similarly addresses international data transfers and establishes requirements concerning security, confidentiality, processing instructions and subprocessor oversight. The published vendor DPA carries an update date of 6 March 2023.¹⁶

Data-exposure assessment: documented processing routes

Eventbrite processes information relating to organizers, attendees, event registrations, purchases, payments and attendance. Its DPA establishes the categories and purposes of this processing.¹⁴

Eventbrite identifies external service providers that may access personal data for their specified services, including infrastructure, communications, analytics and payment processing.⁶

The organizer and vendor DPAs establish contractual arrangements for international personal-data transfers and subprocessor involvement.^{14, 16}

Eventbrite also supports organizer-configured analytics and marketing technologies capable of recording visitor, registration and transaction events.^{10, 11, 12, 13}

The September 2026 privacy policy identifies a data protection officer provided through parent company Bending Spoons S.p.A. This establishes a disclosed group-level privacy-governance relationship, although it does not identify the physical location of individual processing operations.¹⁵

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite attendee, organizer or payment information is routinely stored, routed or processed within Israeli jurisdiction. The available contractual disclosures do not provide a complete physical processing-location inventory.^{6, 14, 15, 16}

No public evidence identified of direct access to Eventbrite customer data by Israeli government authorities through an Israeli-hosted Eventbrite system.^{14, 15}

No public evidence identified establishing a named Israeli government data-request programme, disclosure arrangement or Israeli-specific law-enforcement request dataset concerning Eventbrite attendee information. The reviewed contractual and privacy materials do not identify such an arrangement.^{14, 15}

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite operates an Israeli-specific content-moderation data-sharing interface with government authorities. The reviewed documentation describes general organizer event-management functions and data-processing obligations.^{14, 15, 17}

Israeli data-centre operations

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite owning, leasing or operating a data centre in Israel. The available corporate technology disclosures do not identify an Israeli hosting facility.⁷

No public evidence identified of an Israeli cloud region being contractually designated as Eventbrite’s production-data hosting location. Identification of AWS as a subprocessor does not establish the particular AWS regions used by Eventbrite.⁶

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite uses an Israeli cloud region for machine-learning model development, customer analytics or payment-data storage. The reviewed disclosures do not specify such locations.^{6, 7, 14, 15}

Israeli government cloud projects

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite being a supplier, subcontractor or participant in Project Nimbus. Eventbrite’s disclosed AWS relationship does not independently establish participation in a particular government-cloud contract.⁶

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite furnishing sovereign-cloud infrastructure, data-residency services or infrastructure-resilience technology to Israeli state institutions. The reviewed corporate technology disclosure describes commercial platform infrastructure.⁷

Israeli-market platform availability

Eventbrite maintains a public directory of events associated with Israel, including event listings for Israeli locations.¹⁸

The directory establishes an Israel-facing event-discovery service. It does not independently establish ownership of local infrastructure, a contractual relationship with the Israeli government, actual transaction volumes or payment flows associated with particular events.¹⁸

No public evidence identified establishing that a specific listing in the reviewed country-level directory represents an executed Eventbrite technology agreement with a settlement enterprise or Israeli state institution.¹⁸

Eventbrite’s general payment documentation describes country- and currency-dependent eligibility for Eventbrite Payment Processing. The supported payout-country list does not identify Israel among the eligible bank locations in the official indexed version reviewed during the October 2026 research session. Direct retrieval of that particular page was unsuccessful, so the current list remains subject to independent verification.¹⁹

Eventbrite’s payout documentation confirms that Eventbrite Payment Processing is its default direct payment method. If the organizer’s payout country and currency are ineligible, PayPal may be available instead, with the organizer receiving proceeds directly and Eventbrite invoicing applicable service fees.²⁰

Eventbrite’s publicly documented payment functionality therefore distinguishes direct Eventbrite processing from alternative payment arrangements. The published documentation does not establish that Israeli organizers have access to every payment feature supported in other countries.^{19, 20}

No public evidence identified establishing that Israeli organizers are categorically prohibited from publishing free events or using Eventbrite’s event-discovery and registration services. The reviewed documentation establishes geographic discovery and country-dependent payment rules.^{18, 19, 20}

No public evidence identified establishing a complete Israel-specific localization package, guaranteed Hebrew-language support across every organizer function, dedicated Israeli customer-support operation or Israel-specific application feature matrix.^{18, 19, 21}

No public evidence identified establishing precise transaction volumes, numbers of Israeli organizers, average revenue per Israeli organizer or the proportion of Eventbrite’s global transactions associated with Israel.^{18, 19}

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Military and intelligence contracts

No public evidence identified of a direct Eventbrite technology contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence agencies, military cyber commands or defence research facilities. The reviewed technology, payment and API disclosures establish general commercial services but do not identify a contract with any of these organisations.^{7, 19, 21}

Administrative platform provision

Eventbrite publishes documentation describing event-management, ticketing, registration and payment-processing functionality. Its payment documentation describes Eventbrite Payment Processing, payout arrangements and commercial payment handling.¹⁹

The company also provides a developer API through which approved third-party applications can integrate with Eventbrite services.²¹

These materials establish general-purpose digital services. They do not establish that an Israeli military or intelligence organisation has procured or deployed those services.^{19, 21}

Eventbrite’s additional payout documentation describes direct payment processing and potential use of PayPal when direct processing is unavailable for the relevant country and currency. It does not identify Israeli military or government customers.²⁰

Dual-use technology

Eventbrite’s public filings document machine-learning-based discovery, fraud protection and platform automation.⁷

No public evidence identified of these systems being deployed for Israeli military intelligence, population surveillance, operational targeting or law-enforcement monitoring. The disclosed functions concern Eventbrite’s commercial platform.⁷

Offensive cyber capabilities

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite developing, selling, licensing or maintaining offensive cybersecurity tools, exploit frameworks or digital weapons systems for Israeli state actors. Its publicly described technology activities concern event-platform operations and related commercial functions.⁷

Settlement-specific provision

No public evidence identified of an executed Eventbrite technology contract with an Israeli settlement authority or settlement-based enterprise. The available Israel events directory does not establish such an agreement.¹⁸

The existence of a country-level Israel events directory does not independently resolve whether individual listed events occur within internationally recognised occupied territories.¹⁸

No public evidence identified establishing the identity of a specific settlement-based organizer, the terms of an executed platform-service agreement or a completed settlement-related transaction attributable to Eventbrite.^{18, 19}

2021–2024 - documented use of Eventbrite by CapitIL Real Estate: Arvind Dilawar reported in The Progressive on 3 October 2024 that Israeli property agency CapitIL Real Estate had organised 113 real-estate events through Eventbrite between 2021 and 2024, predominantly in the United States. Events reportedly extended geographically from New York to California. CapitIL used Eventbrite to publish event listings and register prospective attendees interested in purchasing property in Israel and East Jerusalem. The article links directly to CapitIL’s Eventbrite organiser profile and a specific event listing, establishing identifiable platform references underlying its reporting. The figure of 113 events is the journalist’s reported count; it could not be independently recounted from the organiser profile during the present research because direct access returned HTTP 429. The available evidence establishes reported third-party use of Eventbrite’s event-publication and registration services, without establishing that all 113 events concerned properties in occupied territory.²²

2023–2024 - identifiable Woodmere event and marketing mechanism: The Progressive links to an Eventbrite listing titled “Woodmere: The Essential Guide to Buying Israel Real Estate”, identified by ticket number 781641670277. The article cites that listing for CapitIL’s description of increased North American demand for relocation to Israel following October 2023. This identifies an event page used to promote a property-information gathering to prospective buyers. Direct retrieval of the listing returned HTTP 429, preventing independent confirmation of its event date, venue, ticket prices, ticket categories, registration totals and payment processing. The existence of an Eventbrite ticket URL does not establish a completed paid ticket sale or property transaction.²²

October 2024 - geographic nexus and attribution: The Progressive identifies Ramot, in occupied East Jerusalem, as a neighbourhood marketed by CapitIL and characterises the company’s wider Eventbrite-supported events as promoting property in Israel and East Jerusalem. The geographic and settlement characterisation is made by journalist Arvind Dilawar, drawing on CapitIL’s marketing material and the article’s discussion of East Jerusalem’s status. The report does not identify an individual property address, cadastral parcel, completed sale or particular Eventbrite registration demonstrably linked to a purchase in Ramot. It also does not establish that every advertised property was within occupied East Jerusalem or a West Bank settlement. The evidence supports an indirect connection between Eventbrite’s registration infrastructure and an agency reported to market East Jerusalem property; the precise connection between individual event registrations and specific settlement properties remains unverified.²²

October 2024 - independent legal and commercial interpretation: The Progressive quotes Marwa Fatafta, Access Now’s Middle East and North Africa policy and advocacy director, who argues that digital platforms can become involved in settlement-related commercial activity through services supplied to third parties. She considered the Eventbrite activity potentially relevant to the UN settlement-business database’s services category. This is an attributed civil-society assessment, not a finding by Eventbrite, a court or the UN database concerning CapitIL’s particular Eventbrite account. The article explicitly states that Eventbrite was absent from the UN database reviewed at publication. It provides no evidence that Eventbrite entered a dedicated settlement-services agreement, received identifiable proceeds from settlement-property transactions or knowingly designed features specifically for settlement marketing.²²

2026 - organiser-side business continuity and evidentiary limits: CapitIL’s publicly accessible website, reached through the historical Ramot URL referenced by The Progressive, currently redirects to jeruhomes.com. The site describes CapitIL as a Jerusalem property agency established in 2017 by Ben Levene and marketing services to international buyers. Its published biography says Levene has organised more than 500 property-related events worldwide. That cumulative claim is broader than, and cannot independently validate, the 113 Eventbrite events reported for 2021–2024. The current website also identifies neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, including locations outside occupied East Jerusalem. The available website content does not establish that any of the claimed 500-plus events used Eventbrite, that CapitIL retained an active Eventbrite account in October 2026 or that its current property inventory includes a specifically identifiable settlement property.^{22, 23}

Post-2024 continuity

Eventbrite’s Israel events directory was identified during the October 2026 research period, providing evidence of a continuing public platform route associated with Israel.¹⁸

No public evidence identified establishing a specific Israeli military, government-cloud or settlement contract continuing after 19 July 2024 or November 2024. The available directory and corporate disclosures do not identify such a contract.^{7, 18}

The continued existence of country-dependent commercial payment documentation during the 2026 research period does not establish that a named Israeli military or settlement entity obtained Eventbrite services after either date.^{19, 20}

October 2024–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: Searches for CapitIL’s continuing use of Eventbrite, subsequent settlement-property events, Eventbrite account suspension, event restoration and removal outcomes produced no independently retrievable post-October 2024 CapitIL event record. The Progressive reported that CapitIL’s account appeared active on 3 October 2024, but direct retrieval of the linked organiser profile and Woodmere listing returned HTTP 429 during the present research. The agency’s continuing public website establishes ongoing property-marketing operations, without establishing continued use of Eventbrite or settlement-related platform activity after the article’s publication.^{22, 23}

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Commercial AI capabilities

Eventbrite’s 2025 annual report identifies investments in artificial intelligence and machine learning intended to support event discovery, search, fraud protection, scalable platform operations and simplified event creation for organizers. These are described as general-purpose commercial platform capabilities.⁷

AI provision to Israeli state bodies

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite supplying AI, machine-learning or autonomous decision-support platforms to Israeli state, military or intelligence institutions. The company’s disclosed AI activities concern its commercial services.⁷

Training data

Eventbrite’s privacy and data-processing documentation establishes that the company handles personal information associated with event activity, registration and attendance.^{14, 15}

No public evidence identified that Eventbrite’s AI models have been trained on intercepted communications, intelligence-derived information or surveillance datasets originating from Israel or occupied territories. The available public AI descriptions do not identify such training datasets.⁷

No public evidence identified specifying Israeli data-hosting arrangements for Eventbrite’s AI model development.^{7, 15}

No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli research institution or Israeli government data provider supplying training datasets to Eventbrite’s commercial recommendation or fraud-prevention models.^{7, 14, 15}

Autonomous targeting and lethality

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite developing or supplying autonomous targeting, fire-control, target-generation or weapons-effects software. The technology functions disclosed in its FY2025 Form 10-K concern commercial event management, fraud protection and platform functionality.⁷

No public evidence identified of an Eventbrite-designed AI system whose primary output is military targeting or kinetic weapons employment.⁷

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Corporate technology strategy

Eventbrite’s 2025 Form 10-K describes continued development of microservices infrastructure, scalability improvements, fraud protection and AI-related platform capabilities.⁷

Ownership transition

Bending Spoons completed its acquisition of Eventbrite on 10 March 2026, establishing the company’s subsequent subsidiary relationship.^{1, 2}

The company’s transaction-related SEC disclosures identify Julia Hartz, Anand Gandhi and members of the pre-acquisition Eventbrite board involved in the merger process. The transaction committee included Sean Moriarty, Katherine August-deWilde and Helen Riley.²⁴

Those names document historical transaction governance. No public evidence identified in the reviewed transaction disclosure establishing qualifying investments by these individuals in the specified Israeli defence, surveillance or intelligence-technology companies.²⁴

The acquisition documents identify Bending Spoons as the acquiring group. No public evidence identified in the reviewed acquisition disclosures establishing that every technology supplier, investment or product associated with a sibling business was deployed within Eventbrite.^{4, 5}

No public evidence identified establishing qualifying personal investments by Eventbrite’s current controlling principals through identified family-office or personal-investment vehicles in Israeli surveillance, SIGINT or military technology companies. The reviewed merger disclosures do not provide a comprehensive present-day investment register.^{4, 5, 24}

UK subsidiary governance

Companies House records show governance and control changes at Eventbrite UK Limited during 2026, including appointments of Mattie Maharaj, Jared Mulligan and Francesco Patarnello in April 2026.³

The register also records notification of Bending Spoons S.p.A. as a person with significant control from 1 July 2026.³

Israeli research and development centres

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite operating an engineering office, research laboratory, startup accelerator or technology-development centre in Israel. The reviewed corporate technology disclosures do not identify such a facility.⁷

No public evidence identified establishing that Bending Spoons operates an Israeli R&D programme specifically supporting Eventbrite. The acquisition disclosures describe broader group technology capabilities without identifying such a programme.^{4, 5}

Israeli acquisitions and investments

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite acquiring an Israeli-origin cybersecurity, intelligence, AI or surveillance company. The reviewed merger documents establish the Bending Spoons acquisition of Eventbrite rather than such an acquisition by Eventbrite.^{1, 2}

No public evidence identified establishing that Eventbrite’s named former executives or transaction committee members made qualifying personal investments in specified Israeli defence, surveillance or intelligence-technology firms.²⁴

No public evidence identified establishing a qualifying investment by an Eventbrite controlling principal through a documented personal or family-office vehicle. The reviewed acquisition documentation does not provide a complete current beneficial-ownership or personal-investment inventory for Bending Spoons and its controlling principals.^{4, 5}

No public evidence identified establishing an acquisition of an Israeli-origin security, surveillance or military technology company whose products were subsequently integrated into Eventbrite through the Bending Spoons group.^{4, 5}

Patents and intellectual property

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite entering a documented patent-licensing or research-development agreement with Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute or another Israeli research institution. The reviewed corporate technology disclosure does not identify such an agreement.⁷

No public evidence identified of Eventbrite receiving a material Israeli-origin patent assignment relating to surveillance, cybersecurity or defence technology.⁷

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

United Nations and NGO investigations

Research screening examined Eventbrite’s possible appearance in connection with the OHCHR settlement-business database and UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23. No public evidence identified establishing an Eventbrite-specific finding in those materials concerning Israeli settlement technology, military cloud services or surveillance infrastructure. The existing End Note inventory contains no direct citation to either UN document, so this remains a screening result rather than a comprehensive examination of those records.^{7, 18}

The October 2026 research identified A/HRC/59/23 through official United Nations indexing, but direct retrieval was unsuccessful. No additional Eventbrite-specific finding was established from successfully retrieved material. The report therefore remains an unresolved primary-source screening item.^{7, 18}

No public evidence identified establishing an Eventbrite-specific technology-provision finding by Who Profits, AFSC Investigate, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or Al-Haq. The current research did not independently inspect every historical database revision or the locally curated NGO report library.^{7, 18}

Israeli-market presence

Eventbrite’s public directory establishes that its event-discovery service includes listings associated with Israel.¹⁸

The directory does not independently establish the identity of all ticket purchasers, ultimate financial recipients, individual payment processors or contractual arrangements governing particular events.¹⁸

Eventbrite’s general payout documentation distinguishes direct Eventbrite Payment Processing from possible PayPal arrangements. The existence of these published options does not establish their actual use by any particular Israel-based organizer.²⁰

2024 - nature and limits of the digital service: The Progressive’s reporting identifies the practical mechanism as Eventbrite-hosted event pages and attendee registration for property-information events organised by CapitIL. Events were reportedly held predominantly in the United States, with a geographic range extending from New York to California. The platform therefore served as a digital intermediary for overseas marketing and registration; the reported event locations do not themselves establish physical Eventbrite operations within settlements. No evidence in the report establishes Eventbrite’s participation in property valuation, conveyancing, mortgage arrangements, transfer of title or completed purchases.²²

2024–2026 - independent operator and general-purpose platform limitation: The identified property promoter was CapitIL, an independently operating real-estate agency. Its current website describes its own brokerage operations, international clientele and property-marketing activities. The Progressive establishes use of Eventbrite as a third-party event platform but does not identify Eventbrite as a real-estate broker, property seller, event co-organiser or commercial partner in individual property transactions. The sources do not establish Eventbrite’s prior knowledge of the specific properties promoted or its endorsement of their location or legal status. These limitations apply alongside the evidence of platform use when assessing whether a settlement-specific digital service was provided.^{22, 23}

2024–2026 - no public evidence identified concerning additional organisers: Searches combining Eventbrite with Israeli settlement property sales, West Bank real estate, East Jerusalem property marketing and comparable organiser terminology did not establish another independently verified Eventbrite organiser offering identifiable settlement properties or settlement-specific property services. A separately surfaced Eventbrite listing titled “Buying Property in Israel”, advertised for 5 July–30 August, describes an online presentation about investing in Israeli property. Its accessible description does not identify properties in East Jerusalem or West Bank settlements. It therefore cannot be classified as documented settlement-property marketing.²⁵

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of a documented organised campaign specifically targeting Eventbrite because of verified technology provision to the Israeli military, Israeli intelligence services or settlement authorities.^{7, 18}

No public evidence identified of an Eventbrite company response to such a technology-specific campaign.^{7, 18}

Platform moderation

Eventbrite’s published documentation describes functionality allowing organizers to unpublish or delete events, subject to conditions relating to existing orders and refunds.¹⁷

This establishes event-management functionality available to organizers. It does not establish a government-directed moderation policy.¹⁷

No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli government-directed Eventbrite content-moderation or event-removal policy specifically concerning Palestinian events. The reviewed organizer functionality documentation does not identify such a policy.¹⁷

No public evidence identified establishing an Israeli government-specific data-disclosure or content-removal transparency report published by Eventbrite in the reviewed privacy and platform-management materials.^{15, 17}

October–December 2023 - removal of “Stop the Genocide! Free Palestine!”: Contemporaneous reporting establishes that Eventbrite removed the listing for a 1 November 2023 panel at New York City’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Community Center. The organizer was identified as Tempest NYC. On 26 October 2023, OutKick reported that the listing had disappeared that morning, following its criticism of Eventbrite for permitting Palestine-related events while removing other controversial listings. The report identified the original event, described its contents and reproduced evidence of its removal. The event was therefore reported removed by 26 October, earlier than the December 2023 date associated with a subsequent congressional investigation. No Eventbrite removal notice specifying the reason for this particular decision was identified. Eventbrite did not answer OutKick’s contemporaneous request for an explanation.²⁶

December 2023 - no public evidence identified: Searches for the exact event title, original Eventbrite ticket identifier 742320730287, December 2023 congressional briefing, removal decisions and restoration outcomes did not establish a separate, independently documented December removal decision. The earlier October reporting establishes disappearance of the listing. The available evidence does not establish whether Eventbrite temporarily restored the listing before any later removal, whether the December reference describes a second intervention, or whether an organizer appeal succeeded. The original Eventbrite page could not be retrieved directly during this research.²⁶

August 2024 - Doctors Against Genocide fundraiser removal: The New Arab reported on 29 August 2024 that Eventbrite had removed a planned “Palestine Fundraiser” associated with Doctors Against Genocide, Within Our Lifetime and healthcare workers. Palestinian-American organizer Nerdeen Kiswani publicized the decision and shared an Eventbrite notification. According to the reported notification, Eventbrite determined that the event violated its Community Guidelines and Terms of Service because it could contribute to a risk of harm or incite violence. Eventbrite also warned that subsequent violations could lead to account suspension or termination. A separately accessible reproduction of Within Our Lifetime’s 29 August statement confirms that organizers publicly described the removal and demanded reinstatement. This provides an organizer account, a contemporaneous reproduction of the company’s stated reason and independent journalistic corroboration. No detailed Eventbrite explanation identifying the allegedly harmful content was established.^{27, 28}

August 2024 - documented downstream digital restriction: The fundraiser’s removal eliminated its Eventbrite event page as an available route for public discovery and Eventbrite-based ticket acquisition. Within Our Lifetime expressly stated that its event page had been removed and directed prospective attendees to an alternative ticket-purchase link. The fundraiser sought medical and humanitarian support for Al-Awda Maternity Hospital in Gaza and communities including Kusra, Umm El Khair and Masafer Yatta in the West Bank. The documented restriction therefore affected identifiable Palestinian solidarity organizers and an initiative intended to benefit Palestinian healthcare recipients. It does not establish that the underlying fundraiser was cancelled, that alternative ticketing failed, or that a particular amount of medical assistance was lost.^{27, 28}

October 2023 - documented downstream digital restriction: Removal of the Tempest NYC listing prevented ordinary access to that event through its previously published Eventbrite page. OutKick reported that references to removed listings continued appearing in Eventbrite search results, demonstrating that residual search visibility could coexist with unavailable event pages. The identified organizer was Tempest NYC, and the event concerned Palestinian liberation and international solidarity. The available reporting does not establish that Tempest NYC was a Palestinian organization, that a specific Palestinian beneficiary was designated, or that the removal caused measurable losses of registration, attendance, fundraising or assistance. No verified registration count, appeal outcome or alternative ticketing record was identified for this event.²⁶

October 2023 - additional independently documented removal: Professor Neve Gordon’s first-person account, published by Verso Books on 20 November 2023, describes Eventbrite removing a Queen Mary University of London School of Law event featuring Palestinian BDS co-founder Omar Barghouti. The talk, scheduled for 7 November, was titled “Carnage in Palestine: Oppression, Complicity and Ethical Responsibility.” Gordon states that organizers received an Eventbrite removal email on 26 October referring to its Community Guidelines, Terms of Service and antisemitism. The organizers retained registrant contact information and transferred the event to Zoom, where it proceeded with an audience. This establishes another distinct Palestine-related platform removal with a directly identified Palestinian participant, while also establishing successful mitigation and the absence of a demonstrated cancellation of the underlying event.²⁹

Causation and decision authority: For the October 2023 Tempest NYC removal, contemporaneous reporting establishes temporal proximity to external media criticism and direct inquiries to Eventbrite. That sequence supports external scrutiny as a possible influence but does not prove that a third party formally requested removal, that Eventbrite acted on such a request, or that a government authority directed it. For the August 2024 fundraiser, the reported Eventbrite notice attributes the decision to the platform’s own content rules, while Within Our Lifetime independently identifies Eventbrite as the actor removing the page. No government removal order, formal third-party complaint, organizer-initiated deletion or internal moderation record was identified for either case. Eventbrite appears to have executed both restrictions, but their initiating triggers and complete decision processes remain unresolved.^{26, 27, 28}

V6.5 anti_palestinian_digital_harm assessment - October 2023: The Tempest NYC incident provides evidence of an Eventbrite listing removed in connection with Palestinian political expression. Its documented outcome is digital, and removing the event page restricted an existing platform route for discovery and registration. However, the identified organizer’s Palestinian identity or representative status, specific Palestinian beneficiaries and measurable downstream consequences remain unestablished. The incident supports contextual evidence of Palestine-related digital restriction, but the available record is insufficient to establish the full V6.5 anti_palestinian_digital_harm target nexus independently if that nexus requires an identifiable Palestinian organizer or beneficiary directly affected by the restriction. A politically related event alone does not resolve that evidentiary requirement.²⁶

V6.5 anti_palestinian_digital_harm assessment - August 2024: The Doctors Against Genocide fundraiser provides stronger evidence of the specified target nexus. Identified organizers included Palestinian-led Within Our Lifetime, and intended beneficiaries included Palestinian maternal healthcare and West Bank communities. The Eventbrite removal constitutes a documented digital access restriction, supporting outcome_type=digital and effect_direction=supports_or_enables insofar as those fields describe a company action that restricted Palestinians’ access to organizing, event discovery or fundraising infrastructure. The qualifying harm is loss of the Eventbrite distribution and ticketing channel. The record does not establish completed financial deprivation, cancellation of medical deliveries or deliberate anti-Palestinian motivation. These limitations constrain the severity and causal interpretation without negating the documented platform-level restriction.^{27, 28}

Repeated suppression and counterevidence: The October 2023 Tempest NYC removal, the separately documented October 2023 Queen Mary removal and the August 2024 fundraiser removal establish multiple Palestine-related moderation incidents over approximately ten months. The August incident establishes that such restrictions occurred after 19 July 2024. However, the incidents do not independently establish a continuous moderation campaign, a uniform anti-Palestinian rule or systematic targeting across Eventbrite’s user base. OutKick’s contemporaneous October 2023 report also identified another Palestine-related event, “Abolition and the Liberation of Palestine,” remaining available for registration. The evidence therefore supports repeated, individually documented restrictions alongside selective continued availability, rather than categorical exclusion of Palestine-related events.^{26, 27, 29}

2025–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: Searches for subsequent Eventbrite removals affecting Palestinian organizers, restoration of the August 2024 fundraiser, organizer appeals, government takedown requests and documented continuing restrictions produced no additional independently verified incident after August 2024. A May 2025 newsletter advertised fundraising by Doctors Against Genocide, Healthcare Workers for Palestine and Within Our Lifetime through an external donation link, indicating continued fundraising activity without establishing restoration of the removed Eventbrite listing. Searches also surfaced indexed Eventbrite listings for Palestine fundraisers in 2025–2026, but direct retrieval returned access errors; those listings were therefore excluded from the verified evidence base. The available evidence does not support a finding of sustained Eventbrite-wide digital suppression through October 2026.^{27, 28, 30}

October 2024 - documented request for comment and absence of response: The Progressive states that neither Eventbrite nor CapitIL responded to multiple requests for comment before publication on 3 October 2024. The article raised questions concerning CapitIL’s use of Eventbrite for property-marketing events and noted that its organiser account appeared active at the time. The requests for comment establish journalistic scrutiny but do not establish that Eventbrite received a formal platform complaint, accepted a moderation report, opened an investigation or reached an internal compliance determination. No company explanation, moderation notice, suspension decision or settlement-property-specific policy change is documented in the article.²²

October 2024–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: Searches for an Eventbrite response to The Progressive’s reporting, a settlement-property complaint outcome, CapitIL event takedowns, account restrictions, policy amendments and published reinstatement decisions produced no independently verified resolution. The inability to retrieve the historical Eventbrite pages prevents distinguishing subsequent platform removal from organiser deletion, event expiry or access restrictions. No finding that Eventbrite removed or deliberately retained particular CapitIL listings after October 2024 is supported by the accessible evidence.²²

Regulatory and legal proceedings

No public evidence identified of an export-control enforcement action, sanctions proceeding, procurement investigation or legal challenge specifically concerning Eventbrite’s sale of technology to Israeli military or intelligence agencies.^{7, 19}

Eventbrite’s published privacy documentation identifies obligations relating to consumer data rights, processor contracts and information security.^{14, 15, 31}

Its vulnerability-disclosure programme provides a reporting channel for security researchers.³²

These general compliance and security arrangements do not establish an Israel-specific regulatory proceeding.^{14, 15, 31, 32}