INDEX / DIRECTORY / HONEYWELL

Honeywell

Industrial & Conglomerates 81 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-22 METHOD V6.5
Complicity Index score 824 /1000 A Tier A - Extreme
Military ↗ 6.04 Digital ↗ 2.50 Economic ↗ 6.20 Political ↗ 8.90
OWNERSHIP TREE 40 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Military: Honeywell supplied engines and long-term support for Israel’s 30 M-346 “Lavi” trainers, aircraft components through UK licences, and subsystems for Israeli-operated F-15, F-16 and F-35 platforms.1, 2, 3
  • Military: A Honeywell HG1930BA06 inertial measurement unit was identified in debris from the 6 June 2024 al-Sardi school strike in Nuseirat; Honeywell’s HG1700/HG1930 product lines are used in JDAM and GBU-39 guidance systems.4, 5
  • Economic: Honeywell acquired Israeli cybersecurity companies Nextnine and SCADAfence, forming and expanding its Tel Aviv Cybersecurity Center of Excellence.6, 7
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of Honeywell facilities in settlements, Honeywell-branded products specifically installed at settlement sites, or a direct role in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Israeli military base services, or Project Nimbus.8, 9, 10

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameHoneywell International Inc.
JurisdictionUnited States - Delaware incorporation.11
HeadquartersCharlotte, North Carolina, United States.11
SectorDiversified industrial conglomerate spanning aerospace, building technologies, performance materials, industrial automation, and cybersecurity.11, 12
OwnershipPublicly traded, widely held company (NASDAQ: HON), with no controlling parent identified.13
Key Executives / GovernanceVimal Kapur is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; Marc Steinberg joined the Board effective 31 May 2025.14, 15
Israeli-Nexus SummaryDocumented nexus consists principally of aerospace and precision-guidance supply chains serving Israeli military platforms, Israeli cybersecurity acquisitions, and formal collaborations with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).1, 5, 6

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Honeywell’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus is primarily aerospace, military-subsystem, and industrial-cybersecurity related. The strongest documented connection is its supply-chain role in Israeli Air Force platforms and precision munitions: a joint venture including Honeywell received the approximately US$735 million Israeli Ministry of Defense contract for engines and aftermarket support for 30 M-346 “Lavi” trainers; Honeywell also supplied wheel and brake systems for Israeli F-15/F-16 fleets and F-15 engine containment rings through United States Foreign Military Sales channels.1, 2

Honeywell is a supplier of subsystems rather than the prime manufacturer of JDAMs, GBU-39 bombs, or F-35 aircraft. Its HG1700 and HG1930 inertial measurement units are identified as components in Boeing JDAM guidance kits and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. Reporting by Al Jazeera’s Sanad unit, reproduced by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, identified a Honeywell HG1930BA06 unit in debris after the 6 June 2024 Israeli strike on al-Sardi school in Nuseirat.4, 5 That forensic finding documents the presence of a Honeywell-made component at the strike site; it does not by itself establish Honeywell’s control over target selection, operational deployment, or the specific transaction through which the munition reached Israel.4, 5

Honeywell also has a documented Israeli technology footprint. It acquired Nextnine in 2017 and SCADAfence in 2023, with the latter expanding Honeywell’s Tel Aviv Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. The available record characterizes those operations as OT/ICS/IoT cybersecurity work for industrial and critical-infrastructure environments; no public evidence identified shows that Honeywell supplied offensive cyber capabilities, target-generation systems, Project Nimbus services, population-data systems, or Israeli surveillance platforms.6, 7, 10

The record also contains material limits and exculpatory findings. No public evidence identified places Honeywell facilities or dealers in settlements, confirms Honeywell-branded equipment at the settlement sites served by its listed Israeli representative G1 Secure Solutions, or identifies Honeywell in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-business database or the retrieved text of the 2025 Albanese report.8, 9, 16 The fixed, human-vetted V6.5 outcome is BRS 824, Tier A (Extreme Complicity). This result reflects the evidence record and scoring method supplied for this dossier; it does not convert unverified allegations, indirect association, or absent evidence into findings.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
2007–2011Honeywell participated in an IAI-led upgrade of Israeli Air Force Boeing 707 tanker cockpit avionics and trained IAF pilots on the upgraded systems in the United States.17
September 2012International Turbine Engine Company LLC, including Honeywell, received an approximately US$735 million Israeli Ministry of Defense contract for F124-GA-200 engines and support for 30 M-346 trainers; TOR, an Elbit Systems–IAI joint venture, was the named Israeli counterparty.1
2015–2017Honeywell supplied wheel and brake systems for Israeli F-15 and F-16 fleets through U.S. Foreign Military Sales.2
June 2017Honeywell acquired Israeli industrial-cybersecurity company Nextnine for a reported US$35–40 million.6
July 2017 / June 2018Honeywell and IAI entered an MoU and then a teaming agreement for a military GPS anti-jam navigation system combining IAI ADA technology and Honeywell GPS/INS products.18
2022–2023Honeywell’s UK subsidiary received three approved export licences for aircraft components to Israel; the available record links these to F-35 production but does not publicly itemize all goods.3
July–August 2023Honeywell announced and completed its acquisition of SCADAfence; its Q3 2023 filing reported US$52 million net of cash acquired for 100% of outstanding equity.7, 19
6 June 2024Al Jazeera’s Sanad unit reported identifying a Honeywell HG1930BA06 IMU, manufactured in 2022, in debris from the al-Sardi school strike in Nuseirat.4
3 July 2024Business & Human Rights Resource Centre recorded that Honeywell did not respond to an urgent UN-experts call concerning arms transfers to Israel.20
2023–2024Honeywell supplied F-15 engine containment rings to Israel through U.S. Foreign Military Sales.2
March 2026Reporting stated that Israel ordered up to 5,000 GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs; the audit identifies Honeywell HG1930 IMUs as a navigation subsystem in that weapon family, while deliveries were reported as not expected for 36 months.21

Corporate Overview

Honeywell International Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated, publicly traded U.S. industrial conglomerate headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Its audited profile describes aerospace, building technologies, performance materials, industrial automation, and cybersecurity activities; it is not an Israeli-founded company and no Israeli state ownership or controlling parent was identified.11, 12, 13

The company’s confirmed Israel-domiciled operational presence derives from acquisitions rather than founding ties. Honeywell acquired Petah Tikva-based Nextnine in 2017 and Tel Aviv/Ramat Gan-based SCADAfence in 2023. SCADAfence was integrated into Honeywell’s cybersecurity business and was reported to expand the Tel Aviv Cybersecurity Center of Excellence.6, 7, 19 No public evidence identified establishes a current aggregate Honeywell-Israel headcount, Israel-specific revenues, an Israeli manufacturing footprint for these units, or an IDF, settlement, or critical-infrastructure customer nexus for the acquired cybersecurity businesses beyond their general industrial-security orientation.7, 13

G1 Secure Solutions, formerly G4S Israel, was documented by Who Profits as an Israeli representative for Honeywell and several other brands as of 19 April 2022.9 G1 itself was documented as operating security and CCTV systems in settlements and settlement industrial zones. However, the evidence does not establish that Honeywell-branded products, rather than the other represented brands or G1’s own systems, were installed at those locations; the post-April-2022 status of the representation relationship is unconfirmed.9

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The record documents direct and indirect military supply relationships. The most substantial named contract is the approximately US$735 million 2012 Israeli Ministry of Defense award to International Turbine Engine Company LLC, a venture including Honeywell, for F124-GA-200 engines and long-term aftermarket support for 30 Israeli M-346 “Lavi” trainers.1 Honeywell also participated in the IAI-led Boeing 707 tanker-avionics upgrade, supplied F-15/F-16 wheel and brake systems through U.S. FMS between 2015 and 2017, and supplied F-15 engine containment rings in 2023–2024.2, 17

Honeywell supplies numerous subsystems to the F-35 platform, which Israel operates as the F-35I “Adir,” including the power and thermal management system, GTS130 auxiliary power unit, navigation, fuel-control, wheels-and-brakes, life-support, and certain radio-frequency components.22 Honeywell’s UK subsidiaries also obtained approved licences for military goods to Israel, including three aircraft-component licences in 2022–2023. Product-specific detail for the wider licence history is not publicly disclosed, and the record does not confirm whether any Honeywell licences were affected by the United Kingdom’s 2024 partial suspension.3

The HG1700 and HG1930 IMUs are components in Boeing JDAM guidance kits and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs respectively. The audits identify an HG1930BA06 unit in evidence from the al-Sardi school strike, and identify a March 2026 order for additional GBU-39/B bombs. Honeywell’s role is component manufacture within larger Boeing weapon systems, not prime manufacture of those munitions.4, 5, 21

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Honeywell can argue, with support from the record, that it is a diversified industrial company rather than a dedicated weapons producer; AFSC’s cited estimate places military applications at approximately 13% of 2022 revenue.23 Many cited products are dual-use aerospace, navigation, power, or platform subsystems sold through prime contractors or government-to-government FMS channels. The al-Sardi finding identifies a component at a strike site but does not establish Honeywell’s operational control, targeting involvement, or knowledge of the particular strike.4, 5

No public evidence identified shows Honeywell as a prime contractor for small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, naval vessels, tactical drones, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, or Arrow. No public evidence identified shows Honeywell providing Israeli military base services, freight handling, fuel, catering, detention-facility services, settlement construction equipment, barrier maintenance, or checkpoint infrastructure.8, 24

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
Israeli Ministry of Defense / TOR2012 M-346 engine and support contract through ITEC; TOR was an Elbit–IAI venture.1Contract documents engine/support relationship, not combat use.
Israel Aerospace IndustriesBoeing 707 avionics programme; GPS anti-jam collaboration; Heron sense-and-avoid development.17, 18, 25Heron-family deployment reporting does not prove Honeywell systems were used in a specific operation.
BoeingHoneywell IMUs are identified in JDAM and GBU-39 supply chains.5Honeywell is not the prime munition manufacturer.
Lockheed MartinHoneywell supplies listed F-35 subsystems.22Platform supply does not establish operational control.

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Honeywell acquired Nextnine and SCADAfence, Israeli firms specializing in industrial operational-technology and industrial-control-system cybersecurity. The acquisitions formed and expanded Honeywell’s Tel Aviv Cybersecurity Center of Excellence; SCADAfence’s acquisition consideration was reported in Honeywell’s filing as US$52 million net of cash acquired.6, 7, 19

The audits also identify the Honeywell–IAI GPS anti-jam navigation collaboration as a defense technology relationship. It combines IAI’s ADA controlled-reception-pattern-antenna technology with Honeywell embedded GPS/INS products for military aircraft, UAVs, ships, and other military customers.18 This is a military navigation capability, not evidence of offensive cyber activity.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified shows Honeywell providing offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploits, autonomous target generation, AI/ML decision-support systems, civilian-data platforms, predictive policing, facial recognition, social-media monitoring, or surveillance technologies to Israeli state or military actors.10 No public evidence identified shows Honeywell participation in Project Nimbus, operation of Israeli data centres, or data-sovereignty services marketed to Israeli state or military institutions.10

The record does not establish an IDF, settlement, or Israeli critical-infrastructure client relationship for Nextnine or SCADAfence. A reported claim that Honeywell purchases commercial products from Elbit is single-sourced and lacks independently corroborated product categories, dates, and financial scale.23

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
NextnineAcquired by Honeywell in 2017; identified as foundation of its Israel R&D presence.6No public evidence identified of military or settlement clients.
SCADAfenceAcquired in 2023 and integrated into Honeywell cybersecurity operations.7, 19Industrial-security focus does not establish offensive or military cyber deployment.
IAIJoint GPS anti-jam navigation development and marketing agreement.18Evidence concerns navigation systems, not cyber intrusion or surveillance.

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Honeywell’s documented economic connection is its investment and operational presence in Israel through Nextnine and SCADAfence, alongside continuing defense supply relationships. Its Israel-linked footprint is characterized as a cybersecurity R&D and operations presence rather than a national-scale manufacturing or consumer-retail operation.6, 7, 13

Honeywell’s supply-chain role in precision munitions is economically material in character but indirect: its IMUs enter Boeing’s JDAM and GBU-39 systems rather than being sold as Honeywell-branded completed weapons. PAX’s June 2024 report named six principal arms-selling companies and did not include Honeywell among them.5, 26 Honeywell’s public filings do not separately disclose Israel-specific revenue.13

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified shows Honeywell sourcing Israeli agricultural produce, engaging in settlement-origin consumer-goods labeling, financing Israeli sovereign debt, selling Israel Bonds, underwriting Israeli state debt, or providing direct lending or trade-finance to Israeli defence firms or settlement businesses.27, 13 No public evidence identified confirms Honeywell-branded goods at the settlement locations served by G1 Secure Solutions.9

Honeywell is not Israeli-owned, Israeli-tax-resident at the parent level, or headquartered in Israel. The audits identify no evidence that Elliott Investment Management’s stake, Marc Steinberg’s board role, or Paul Singer’s separately reported Israel-related interests resulted in a Honeywell corporate act directed by them concerning Israel.11, 15

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
NextnineIsraeli cybersecurity acquisition, reported US$35–40 million.6Current revenue and headcount not publicly established.
SCADAfenceIsraeli cybersecurity acquisition; US$52 million net-of-cash consideration reported in 2023 filing.7, 19No public evidence identified of Israeli military or settlement customers.
G1 Secure SolutionsListed as Israeli representative of Honeywell and other brands.9Settlement operations by G1 do not prove Honeywell product deployment.
Elliott / Marc SteinbergElliott disclosed a major Honeywell stake; Steinberg joined Honeywell’s Board.14, 15No evidence identified of Israel-specific direction of Honeywell policy or conduct.

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The political record primarily concerns corporate silence, public accountability, and the political implications attributed by civil society to documented military supply. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre reported that Honeywell did not respond to a 3 July 2024 call by UN experts to cease arms transfers to Israel.20 The audit contrasts this with Honeywell’s public suspension of Russia/Belarus operations in 2022 and its 2020 statement opposing racism; no Honeywell or Vimal Kapur public statement on Israel/Palestine, 7 October, or the Gaza war was identified in the reviewed record.28, 29

Honeywell International PAC is funded by voluntary employee contributions. It gave approximately US$1.811 million to federal candidates in the 2023–2024 cycle, but no direct evidence identified links recipient decisions or lobbying filings to Israel-specific policy advocacy.30 Honeywell was also listed in reporting on companies whose employee matching-gift programmes could match donations to Friends of the Israel Defense Forces; the audit does not identify direct corporate donations, and the reported matching practice was not independently reconfirmed for 2025–2026.31

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified shows Honeywell lobbying specifically on Israel, donating corporate funds to FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement organizations, or Israel Bonds, hosting Israeli officials, receiving Israeli state honours, or sponsoring “Brand Israel” campaigns.30, 31 No public evidence identified identifies executive personal donations or fundraising for military-welfare, settlement, or pro-Israel advocacy groups.32

No public evidence identified shows Honeywell in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-business database, in retrieved text of the Albanese report, or in formal legal proceedings or regulatory enforcement specifically concerning Israel-related conduct.16, 33 Civil-society campaigns, protests, and divestment actions document public criticism, not judicial or governmental findings against Honeywell.34

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
Honeywell / Vimal KapurNo identified public Israel/Palestine statement; recorded non-response to 2024 UN-experts call.20Absence of a public statement does not establish motive or internal policy.
Honeywell International PACVoluntary employee-funded PAC; approximately US$1.811 million in 2023–2024 federal giving.30No identified Israel-specific lobbying or verified AIPAC-recipient overlap.
FIDFHoneywell listed in reporting on corporate matching-gift programmes.31No direct corporate donation identified; current practice unconfirmed.
Civil-society coalitionsProtests and campaigns have targeted Honeywell’s military supply chain.34Campaign claims are not themselves adjudicated findings.

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military6.507.006.506.04
Digital5.003.508.002.50
Economic7.006.209.006.20
Political8.907.009.008.90

The fixed V6.5 result identifies Political as the maximum domain score and records elevated scores across the other audited domains. The tier reflects the corpus’s scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted method: it is an assessment of documented activity type, scale, and directness, not a finding of legal liability or a substitute for adjudication.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/honeywell-secures-major-engine-contract-from-israel-ministry-of-defense-168605106.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  2. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/honeywell ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  3. https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/honeywell/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  4. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/6/us-weapons-parts-used-in-israeli-attack-on-gaza-school-al-jazeera-analysis ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  5. https://afsc.org/gaza-genocide-companies ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  6. https://www.timesofisrael.com/honeywell-nextnine-deal-illustrates-owners-dilemma-sell-or-hold/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  7. https://www.honeywell.com/us/en/press/2023/07/honeywell-to-acquire-scadafence-strengthening-its-cybersecurity-software-portfolio ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  8. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  9. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3798 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  10. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000077384024000014/hon-20231231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  12. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000077384026000029/hon-20260409.htm ↩ ↩2

  13. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000077384023000085/hon-20230930.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  14. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/11/12/elliott-honeywell-activist-breakup.html ↩ ↩2

  15. https://investor.honeywell.com/news-releases/news-release-details/honeywell-appoints-marc-steinberg-board-directors ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session59/advance-version/a-hrc-59-23-aev.pdf ↩ ↩2

  17. https://www.flightglobal.com/iai-gets-contract-for-last-707-tanker-conversion/98020.article ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  18. https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/about-us/press-release/2018/06/honeywell-and-israel-aerospace-collaborate-on-anti-jam-solution ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  19. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000077384023000085/hon-20230930.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/honeywell-did-not-respond-to-the-urgent-call-by-un-experts-to-cease-the-transfer-of-arms-to-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  21. https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/israel-orders-5-000-boeing-gbu-39-precision-bombs-to-expand-air-force-strike-capacity ↩ ↩2

  22. https://www.honeywellaerospace.com/us/en/industry/defense/f-35 ↩ ↩2

  23. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/honeywell ↩ ↩2

  24. https://corporatewatch.org/honeywell-components-used-to-bomb-gaza-last-summer/ ↩

  25. https://www.aviationtoday.com/2016/07/11/honeywell-israel-aerospace-industries-to-develop-sense-and-avoid-tech-for-iai-uas/ ↩

  26. https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/06/The-Companies-Arming-Israel-and-Their-Financiers-June-2024.pdf ↩

  27. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-concludes-13-million-settlement-of-alleged-export-violations-by-honeywell-international-inc/ ↩

  28. https://www.honeywell.com/us/en/press/2022/03/statement-about-our-business-in-russia-and-belarus ↩

  29. https://honeywell.com/en-us/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/06/a-statement-from-our-chairman-and-ceo-on-our-opposition-to-racism-and-our-promotion-of-equality-and-opportunity ↩

  30. https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/honeywell-international/C00096156/candidate-recipients/2024 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  31. https://truthout.org/articles/these-billionaires-subsidize-the-israeli-military-through-a-us-nonprofit/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000077384026000029/hon-20260409.htm ↩

  33. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩

  34. https://fightbacknews.org/articles/minneapolis-says-honeywell-has-got-to-go ↩ ↩2